Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
108179
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2 |
ID:
159378
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Summary/Abstract |
States commonly take one of three approaches to militant groups on their soil: collaboration; benign neglect; or belligerence. All three approaches are present in Pakistan, where some groups also move back and forth among these categories. I employ the term “coopetition” to capture this fluidity. The dynamic nature of militancy in Pakistan makes the country an excellent laboratory for exploring a state’s assessment of the utility an Islamist militant group offers, and the threat it poses relative to other threats informs the state’s treatment of that group. In this article, I put forward a typology that situates Islamist militants in Pakistan in one of the above four categories. I also illustrate how a group’s identity, objectives, and alliances inform assessments of its utility and threat relative to other threats. In addition to enhancing our understanding of militant–state dynamics, this taxonomy builds on and helps to unify earlier typologies of Pakistani militancy.
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3 |
ID:
131472
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
This essay reviews seven recent books and reports that focus upon the use of US armed drones in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This essay synthesizes a historical account of the program, critically interrogates key arguments and evidence advanced by the authors, and draws attention the particular problems that confront those who live in the FATA and the second-class citizenship that the Pakistani state has bestowed upon them for reasons of domestic and foreign policy concerns. This review essay does not intend to be the final word on any of the ongoing policy debates. But it does hope to enable a wider audience to take part in these important deliberations.
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4 |
ID:
118462
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5 |
ID:
106302
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6 |
ID:
109771
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
Does Pakistan figure in the face-saving deal that the US is trying to thrash out with the Taliban in Doha?
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7 |
ID:
153825
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8 |
ID:
154669
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9 |
ID:
116613
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The United States has more leverage over Pakistan than is widely appreciated, and it is time for American policymakers to use it. Since 2001, two successive administrations have tried to persuade Pakistan to end its support for militants-including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network-exclusively through aid, diplomacy, and persuasion with few sanctions or conditions: an approach of all carrots and no sticks. They did so in the belief that Pakistan's fundamental problem was a lack of capacity, not will. They were wrong.
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10 |
ID:
109720
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11 |
ID:
104502
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12 |
ID:
132224
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13 |
ID:
107585
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14 |
ID:
108452
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15 |
ID:
102111
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16 |
ID:
149710
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Summary/Abstract |
Jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan have experienced leadership turnover and are contending with the emergence of the Islamic State in the region. Antonio Giustozzi assesses the balance of power between militant groups in the borderlands.
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17 |
ID:
116606
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
Afghanistan is America's longest war. Thousands of U.S. troops and those from nearly 50 other countries have fought in Afghanistan against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, but it was in nuclear-armed Pakistan where Osama bin Laden was killed, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (the mastermind of 9/11) was captured, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar as well as the heads of the virulent Haqqani network reside. Pakistan's duplicity is a fact, yet it is often excessively characterized as a function of the India-Pakistan rivalry. Pakistani generals do fear India, but they have also recognized the threat from domestic insurgents. The height of this concern was reached in 2009, when the Pakistani Taliban were 60 miles from the country's capital and jeopardized U.S. as well as Pakistani goals in the region: interdicting al-Qaeda, protecting Pakistani nuclear weapons, and stabilizing (and in Pakistan's case, an anti-India) Afghanistan. At that point, Pakistani troops, unlike past attempts, fought back and prevailed against the insurgents. It can be done.
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18 |
ID:
113151
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19 |
ID:
110138
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20 |
ID:
104139
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