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| 1 |
ID:
118743
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Everyone knows that in addition to its keen interest in the Southern and Northern Caucasus, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is also active in Central Asia, another area of its geopolitical interests.
Much has and is being written about this, but for some reason no one has examined China's presence in the Northern Caspian (I have in mind the Atyrau Region of Kazakhstan, the relations with which are part and parcel of China's Central Asian policy, and the Astrakhan Region and Kalmykia of Russia).
Here I will dwell on Chinese strategy in the two latter regions of the Russian Federation, that is, in the Russian part of the Northern Caspian. As a sort of corridor or link between Central Asia and the Caucasus with a multitude of ties between them and this part of Russia, the region is of immense geopolitical importance for Beijing.
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| 2 |
ID:
118752
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Azov-North Black Sea Subregion is one of the planet's strategically important areas; it is where the interests of different countries meet and intertwine. It is also tied by multiple threads not only to the Azov-Black Sea Region, but also to different regions of Russia and Ukraine.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is pursuing an active policy in the above-mentioned regions. Furthermore, it is primarily interested in the Crimea, which virtually adjoins the Caucasus, the Rostov region, and Donbass (particularly the Lugansk and Donetsk regions); by establishing contacts with them, the PRC is strengthening its position in the Northeast Black Sea and Azov regions. This kind of policy is in keeping with China's overall geopolitical strategy in the Black Sea basin; below we will look at some of its vectors.
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| 3 |
ID:
104581
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| 4 |
ID:
102178
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