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| 1 |
ID:
126774
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The challenge presented by china's military modernization has seemingly altered the conventional balance in the western pacific, with significant implications for U.S. national security policy, and, thus, deserves the focus of planners and decision-makers.
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| 2 |
ID:
125195
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Pacific War ended in 1945 before the American government had established a plan for the implementation of its postwar goals for its relationship with China. Although China lacked unification, the Guomindang (GMD), the "allied" government, sought to create a more modern military along American lines, with American equipment, using American advisers and funding. GMD leaders did not want American influence or control, desiring to maintain their culturally organized structures and ways of functioning, including the use of guanxi (personal networks and favors). The Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group attempted to operate within this nexus of conflicting goals, purposes, and missions.
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| 3 |
ID:
130843
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article examines U.S. foreign relations with Southeast Asia. An increase in U.S. involvement in the region under the administration of President Barack Obama is considered. A contradiction in U.S. policy is said to exist between insistence by the administration that its desire for stability and freedom of the seas in Southeast Asia is not intended as containment of China and China's aggressive maritime boundary claims in the South China Sea.
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| 4 |
ID:
130063
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When it comes to solving problems with China's overreach at sea, there are laws for that.
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| 5 |
ID:
134077
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For almost a decade, Beijing has pursued a "soft" approach toward Taiwan, cultivating economic ties and political exchanges in its pursuit of reunification. Following the end of President Chen Shui-bian's term in office, which was marked by constant tensions and several crises with China, Beijing has colluded with his successor, Ma Ying-jeou to pursue a policy of economic integration with the mainland. Beijing's
strategy toward Taiwan under Chairman Xi Jinping and his predecessor Hu Jintao has yielded positive results. The approach not only avoids possible military conflict with the United States, but receives support from Washington. Beijing's economic means, such as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), have enhanced Taiwan's economic integration with China and greatly increased the
PRC's control over Taiwan's economy and society, helping to lock Taiwan into the mainland's orbit. Likewise, Beijing has developed tools that allow it to intervene directly in Taiwanese domestic politics. However, efforts to use ties with President Ma to bring Taiwan farther into the PRC orbit have backfired, resulting in a weakened presidency that cannot deliver Beijing's goals. Thus, Beijing appears to be looking ahead to the next two elections, trying to make as much progress as possible before Ma leaves office, while simultaneously trying to establish ties with possible successors and the opposition DPP. In 2012, Beijing's intervention assisted the reelection of President Ma. It is sure to try again in Taipei's mayoral election in 2014 and the presidential/parliamentary elections in 2016.
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| 6 |
ID:
130610
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As part of its new strategy of "retuming to the Asia-Pacific region", the A Obama administration has adopted some tough economic policies towards China, notably promoting the Trans-Paci?c Partnership (TPP) and attempting to establish new rules of international trade and investment aimed at strengthening economic ties with other Western countries through the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement(TTlP ), both of which tend to compress the geopolitical space for China's economic rise. The administration is also using a 'green barrier' to suppress the development of China's high-tech industry, and using economic diplomacy and investment restrictions against Chinese state-owned enterprises. This paper seeks to examine and analyze the causes of shifts in the U .S. economic strategy towards China.
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| 7 |
ID:
130618
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the past six decades, Taiwan's China studies have undergone a gradual shift from a focus on policy analysis and political introduction to one that is centred on scholarly research with policy analysis as its secondary aim. During this process, the role of the IIT has shifted from that of a government think thank, monopolizing China studies and serving the top brass jointly with other state-dominated research units, to a competitor for academic achievement and policy influence in a pluralistic academic and political market.
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| 8 |
ID:
116091
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| 9 |
ID:
102254
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2010.
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China is now the world's leading creditor nation, while the United States is the world's largest debtor. Beijing is the largest foreign holder of US government debt - passing Japan in 2008 to become, in effect, the US government's largest foreign creditor. While some claim this gives Beijing unprecedented power over the United States, others claim that China's power is in fact greatly circumscribed. This paper shows that although current patterns of economic interdependence between the two economies invariably pushes each towards cooperation, China is deeply concerned about the future trajectory of the US economy and is already engaged in loosening the bonds of interdependence. This has profound implications for Sino-US relations and the global economy.
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| 10 |
ID:
132787
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China will soon have its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, according to a U.S. Defense Department report released last month.
The report said Beijing is placing a "high priority" on updating and developing its submarine force and will soon deploy the Julang-2 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on its Jin-class submarine.
The Defense Department is required by law to submit an annual report to Congress on China's military capabilities and force modernization.
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| 11 |
ID:
130416
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article reconstructs an ideational trajectory in which China's views of the Korean-American alliance evolved during the last 60 years. The article first surveys China's general policy toward alliance and alliance-making. The article then traces the evolutionary path of Chinese views in the following four periods: (1) the Cold War era (1950s-1960s); (2) transformative years (early 1970s-mid-1990s); (3) the period of a strained alliance (late 1990s-late 2000s); and (4) an era of great reversal (late 2000s-present). Principally, the article suggests that China's view of the Korean-American alliance was intense antagonism during the Cold War era, although it was significantly watered down during the transformative years of Sino-South Korean rapprochement. With the normalization of relations between Beijing and Seoul in 1992 and a decade of progressive rule (1998-2007) in South Korea, China's view encompassed some wishful thinking about a gradually diluted alliance. The strong comeback of the conservatives in South Korean politics since 2008, however, shattered such optimism and re-awoke Beijing to some cold realities. China's view of the Korea-American alliance may grow more negative in tandem with US-China relations, irrespective of the official rhetoric of sovereignty regarding alliance and alliance-making.
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| 12 |
ID:
133060
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China pursues its security through interior strategies that involve the development of rings of security around central areas of national interest. The Chinese have long felt vulnerable from the sea, and their current maritime strategy seeks to reduce that vulnerability by extending a ring of maritime control around China's periphery. China pursues this control through a combination of forcestructure development and legal assertions. Tensions arise because China's strategy conflicts with the territorial claims, resource interests, and security concerns of other states in East Asia. China's strategy also causes friction with the United States, which relies on freedom of navigation in maritime East Asia for American security interests and which must reassure regional allies and partners that American security guarantees are meaningful. In order to ensure the position of the United States in East Asia, American policies must focus on maintaining the region as an open, maritime system. This requires continuous development of technological advantages to ensure that the center of power in Asia does not migrate from the maritime domain to the continent. It also requires the United States to support the ability of allies, friends, and partners to resist China's nonmilitarized coercion, as well as to reinforce the normative structure that supports the efficacy of maritime power in the region and around the globe.
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| 13 |
ID:
114501
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The major, middle and small powers on China's periphery are often portrayed as passive objects of great power competition between the United States and China, but in fact the foreign policy strategies of these states plays a significant role in shaping Sino-U.S. relations and the overall order in Asia. Before examining the actors on China's periphery in this important FPRI conference, therefore, it is worth starting at the macro-level of international relations in Asia within which they operate.
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| 14 |
ID:
130615
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
this article adopts a reflexive approach to investigate the history of the Sino-American Conference on mainland China (SACMC), the Cold War precursor of the Taiwan - US Conference on contemporary China (TUSCCC) organized and hosted by the institute of international relations (IIR) of the republic of China , the Cold war origins of the SACMC demonstrate the nation that power and knowledge- the practice of politics and theory of politics are asymmetrically and symbiotically co-constitute.
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| 15 |
ID:
133955
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 'assertive China discourse' has become a widespread narrative in the United States and certain other countries, and there is a parallel narrative in China. It argues that China has abandoned the taoguangyanghui (Keeping a low profile) strategy and adopted that of fengfayouwei (Striving for achievements), especially since 2009. This article, taking background knowledge as the most important factor of an agent's thinking and doing, argues that the Zhongyong dialectic constitutes a core component of background knowledge on the Chinese. It holds that a strident turn from one strategy to the other is inadvisable, and indeed continuity through change is a realistic description of China's present international strategy. It implies the existence of both continuity and change, although the former is its main theme with regards to strategic goals, designs, and policies as a whole. Changes, however, do occur, mainly through issues perceived as relevant to core national interests. The textual analysis in this article provides support for this argument, but offers little to substantiate the 'assertive China discourse'. Also worthy of note is that it is easy to use such changes to infer a revolutionary turn in China's international strategy, as the 'assertive China discourse' has done, as it fits perfectly into the embedded Hegelian dichotomous structure under the background of a realist tragedy of major power politics. Such an interpretation, however, is both biased and dangerous, because it attempts to turn a constructed narrative into a conventional wisdom. This could potentially culminate in a self-fulfilling prophet of the zero-sum struggle in a Hobbesian jungle, particularly between China and the United States.
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| 16 |
ID:
132023
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following President Richard Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, U.S.-China trade increased almost ten-fold within three years, of which China's agricultural imports represented the largest category. This trade created unprecedented opportunities for the Chinese pragmatists to pursue economic modernization, and sharpened the conflict between them and the radicals who adhered to Mao Zedong's ideological crusade. Drawing on both English and Chinese sources, this article examines the fluctuations of China-U.S. agricultural trade between 1972 and 1978. It focuses on the process of trade management in an ideologically charged environment, specifically, the interactions between the pragmatists and radicals under the dominance of Mao. It argues that this trade brought tremendous pressure on the very framework of that Chinese system, tested the boundaries of Mao's revolutionary ideology, and encouraged a fundamental change of course in China.
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| 17 |
ID:
124941
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| 18 |
ID:
128273
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping.
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| 19 |
ID:
124910
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The "New Politics" in the U.S. is escalating the polarization of politics. The Republican and Democratic Parties hold conflicting views on such vital issues as debt reduction, balancing the budget, reform of medical care and social security, immigration, and ways of ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This aggravated polarization ushered in by the "New Politics" will also influence American foreign policy, especially Sino-U.S. relations.
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| 20 |
ID:
114900
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Shortly after US President Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia
Gillard sealed the bilateral defense deal in November 2011 under which
2500 US marines will be stationed in Australia came Obama's announcement on January 5 2012 of the new strategic defense guidance entitled
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21
st
Century Defence.
The document claims that China's rise might have impact on the US economy and security, and that countries such as China and Iran continue to
pursue asymmetric means of countering US power projection capabilities.
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Both the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense
refuted these claims, arguing that not a shred of evidence exists to support
such wild accusations.
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Many media reports nevertheless argue that competition between the United States and China amounts to a new Cold War.
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