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| 1 |
ID:
154373
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Corridor is, first and foremost, a vital investment for Beijing, which is slowly buying the strategic link, Beijing will soon control its new dominion, Pakistan. For India, it will be game changer as it will then directly face China on two fronts, the Northern and the Western. The Modi government should ponder about this.It is a new great but not easy game. What looks like a masterstroke on paper could turn into a nightmare for both China and Pakistan, unless India is taken onboard.But at a time Pakistan continues to fuel unrest in the Kashmir valley with the silent consent of China, how can Islamabad get New Delhi's blessings for such a gigantic project? Today, China and Pakistan may be gambling, but China has no choice but to understand India's concerns on this issue.
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| 2 |
ID:
134053
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On November 7, 1950, Vallabhbhai Patel wrote his celebrated letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on India's China policy. 'The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention', he stated, referring to Beijing's decision to move troops into Tibet. A new challenge confronted India as a result of the 'disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates'. 'Chinese ambitions … not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also', he added, noting (incorrectly) that 'Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement'.
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| 3 |
ID:
131046
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ever since the border face-off between Indian and Chinese Troops in the Depsang Bulge at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in April 2013, the Indian Army has raised its pitch to acquire Operational Control of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP). But that one incident couldn't have been the trigger, and it's not correct to dismiss ITBP's role in handling the situation. After all, the ITBP had followed all international protocols which ultimately led to the solution through diplomatic channels.
The Indian Army cannot be deployed along the forward posts at the LAC according to various UN conventions. So naturally when the Chinese troops entered the Indian territory close to the Burtse post in the Depsang Bulge, the ITBP was the first respondent. According to a source privy to the information, when the Chinese patrol team was observed coming close to the Burtse post, roughly around one-and-a-half or two kilometres away, the ITBP teams responded immediately. As per the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), the ITBP has to inform all the stakeholders in events such as this. Sources claimed that the information was indeed relayed to all the stakeholders like National Security Advisor (NSA), defence ministry, Indian Army and various intelligence agencies in real time. The ITBP boasts of its quick communication to as many as 11 agencies involved in resolving the stand-off.
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| 4 |
ID:
102326
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