| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
130356
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Global Nuclear Disarmament and risk reduction enterprise is at a crossroads as U.S.-Russian relations have reached perhaps their lowest point in more than a quarter century. Nevertheless, it remains in U.S. and Russian interests to implement existing nuclear risk reduction agreements and pursue practical, low-risk steps to lower tensions. Present circumstances demand new approaches to resolve stubborn challenges to deeper nuclear cuts and the establishment of a new framework to address Euro-Atlantic security issues.
Even before the recent political turmoil in Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin's extralegal occupation and annexation of Crimea, relations between Moscow and Washington were chilly. Despite U.S. adjustments to its missile defense plans in Europe that eliminate any threat to Russian strategic missiles, Putin rebuffed U.S. President Barack Obama's proposal last June to reduce U.S. and Russian strategic stockpiles by one-third below the ceilings set by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
Moving forward will be difficult, but doing nothing is not an option. Through earlier crises during and after the Cold War, U.S. and Russian leaders pursued effective arms control and disarmament initiatives that increased mutual security and significantly reduced the nuclear danger. Much has been achieved, albeit too slowly, but there is far more to be done.
As the world's non-nuclear-weapon states persuasively argue, U.S. and Russian stockpiles still far exceed any plausible deterrence requirements, and the use of just a few nuclear weapons by any country would have catastrophic global consequences. As the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference approaches, pressure to accelerate action on disarmament will only grow.
For now, neither Russia nor the United States wants to scrap the existing arms control regime, including New START and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which provide greater predictability and stability in an otherwise strained bilateral relationship. A return to a period of unconstrained strategic nuclear competition would not only deepen the distrust and increase dangers for both sides, but also would undermine the NPT. Scrapping the existing nuclear risk reduction measures would do nothing to protect Ukraine from further Russian aggression or reassure nervous NATO allies.
Unfortunately, the profound tensions over Ukraine delay the possibility of any formal, bilateral talks on nuclear arms reductions and missile defense. In light of these realities, Obama and other key leaders must explore alternative options to reduce global nuclear dangers and defuse U.S.-Russian strategic tensions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
124816
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
According to PM Kamath, the US as the sole superpower today is unlikely to face a nuclear threat from any other country. Hence as a republic committed to promoting democracy globally, it must embrace the no first use option as tis policy on nuclear weapons to that more nations may be motivated to adopt it. No first use is a far more democratic doctrine than the option of first use and could also be the first step toward global nuclear disarmament.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
132931
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The aim of India's nuclear deterrence capability has been to safeguard itself against blackmail and coercive diplomacy of adversaries. Its doctrinal principles of minimum nuclear deterrence and NFU are consistent with India's declaration of a modest nuclear weapons policy. The official announcements, in the aftermath of the May 1998 tests indicated that India has set out on a pragmatic course of action. Sixteen years after the tests, the Indian government's policies reflect this approach substantially.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
102382
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama administration has argued that its efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US defense policy and work toward "a world free of nuclear weapons" will encourage other governments to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and support global nuclear disarmament. Does the evidence support this assertion? This essay describes the changes in US nuclear weapons and disarmament policies initiated by the Obama administration and outlines four potential pathways through which the United States might influence other governments' policies: by reducing nuclear threat perceptions, by changing global beliefs about what constitutes "responsible" nuclear behavior, by impacting domestic debates about disarmament in foreign capitals, and by creating new diplomatic negotiation dynamics.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
138040
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This issue of nuclear safety and non-proliferation has been tranformed by the proliferation of terrorism in South Asia and the world at large.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|