| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the impact of the utilisation of the RMA on the part of the Colombian and US governments vis-à-vis the Farc. The central argument is that the RMA as applied in Colombia relies on newfangled and sometimes clever conceptions of force that have weakened the relative power of the Farc, but which fail to address the root causes of insurgency in the country that centre on profound economic inequity and violent political exclusion. Over 75 per cent of the $6 billion so far divulged through Plan Colombia has been devoted to military and police assistance, with the rest going to institutional programmes and to a lesser extent to social programmes. Although the insurgents are indeed weaker, as a result both of the RMA as well as misguided policies on the part of the guerrillas themselves, they are by no means 'broken'. Violent conflict in the country will likely persist into the foreseeable future.
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