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Modern View
PRISONERS' DILEMMA
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
115674
Can green building councils serve as third party governance ins
/ Sedlacek, Sabine; Maier, Gunther
Sedlacek, Sabine
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2012.
Summary/Abstract
Green Building Councils (GBCs) have been established in many different countries in recent years. This paper discusses the role such organizations can play in the respective construction and real estate industry and under what circumstances a GBC can contribute positively to the development of a "greener" or "more sustainable" stock of buildings. The paper investigates the main informational problem of the industry by looking at the relation between a developer and an investor from an economic point of view. We argue that the investor's uncertainty about the true quality of a building and the corresponding incentive for the developer to cheat may lock them into a prisoners' dilemma trap. The corresponding barriers for a transition toward a "greener" buildings market are analyzed. GBCs are described as institutions of economic governance that can assist the economy in overcoming these problems. They can act as third party institutions in transactions between developers and investors. By certifying the quality of a building, they can reduce the risk for the investor to be cheated by the developer and also increase the incentive to develop good quality buildings for the developer. This task, however, raises some severe management challenges for the GBCs.
Key Words
Economic Governance
;
Prisoners' Dilemma
;
Green Building Councils
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2
ID:
102498
Peril by proxy: negotiating conflicts in east Africa
/ Brewer, Cecily G
Brewer, Cecily G
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2011.
Summary/Abstract
A proxy war is a conflict in which one party fights its adversary via another party rather than engaging that party in direct conflict. This article discusses two examples: the Sudan-Ugandan proxy war of the 1990s and the Sudan-Chad proxy war that has fed the conflict in Darfur. In these cases, the states aimed to alter regional power structures through cross-border rebel support. This support generated a perpetual Prisoners' Dilemma whereby the patron governments refused to end proxy support unless the other side did as well, but had little reason to trust that the other side would do so. The Sudan-Uganda and Sudan-Chad peace processes succeeded in reaching agreement, but failed in implementation. Permanent resolution of such complex, persistent, and deadly conflicts requires conflict analyses that take a regional view; conflict mediation that seeks to alter the underlying conflict dynamics through addressing the motivations of both patrons and proxies; and implementation agreements backed by strong guarantees.
Key Words
Proxy War
;
Africa
;
Uganda
;
Sudan
;
Mediation
;
Negotiation
;
Six Day War
;
Darfur
;
Democratic Republic of Congo
;
Carter Center
;
Proxy
;
Patron
;
Prisoners' Dilemma
;
Nairobi Agreement
;
Civil War
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