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ID:
103293
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Success in war depends on alignment between operations and strategy. Commonly, such alignment takes time as civilian and military leaders assess the effectiveness of operations and adjust them to ensure that strategic objectives are achieved. This article assesses prospects for the US-led campaign in Afghanistan. Drawing on extensive field research, the authors find that significant progress has been made at the operational level in four key areas: the approach to counterinsurgency operations, development of Afghan security forces, growth of Afghan sub-national governance and military momentum on the ground. However, the situation is bleak at the strategic level. The article identifies three strategic obstacles to campaign success: corruption in Afghan national government, war-weariness in NATO countries and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. These strategic problems require political developments that are beyond the capabilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In other words, further progress at the operational level will not bring 'victory'. It concludes, therefore, that there is an operational-strategic disconnect at the heart of the ISAF campaign.
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| 2 |
ID:
129319
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| 3 |
ID:
123380
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This Article deals with the post 2014 Afghanistan. Once the US forces leave Afghanistan and allow the war-ravaged country to redefine its strategic alliances in its neighbourhood, India-Pakistan rivalry is pitched to look for the larger space in Afghanistan. Therefore, it becomes relevant to weigh the Indian side in the emerging scenario in Afghanistan.
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| 4 |
ID:
129757
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| Summary/Abstract |
With UK combat operations coming to an end in Afghanistan later this year, there will be a window of opportunity to review the hard-won lessons of the campaigns fought in the Middle East since 2001, and to consider the future evolution of counter-insurgency (COIN). Some might argue that it would be more prudent - and easier - simply to say 'never again'. Yet Alexander Alderson argues that insurgency is here to stay. As such, he explores seven challenges on which the UK should focus as it seeks to learn the difficult lessons of the COIN operations of the last decade.
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| 5 |
ID:
113500
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| 6 |
ID:
116088
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| 7 |
ID:
108419
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| 8 |
ID:
118032
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| 9 |
ID:
131469
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns.
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| 10 |
ID:
129215
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| 11 |
ID:
112165
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| 12 |
ID:
116655
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States is not scheduled to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. President Barack Obama made clear in his May 2012 speech in Kabul that the United States would continue to train Afghan security forces and undertake counter-terrorism operations, which are likely to require thousands of US troops to operate in the country for years to come. The year 2014 is a date for transition, not withdrawal, and the international community has pledged to hand over leadership for security to the Afghan government - no more, no less. Afghan leadership will come with a heavy helping hand from the continued presence of international partners.
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