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| 1 |
ID:
128242
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent Nigeria, the domestic terrorism of the Islamic group popularly known as 'Boko Haram' is hard to ignore. Almost everyday, television broadcast of the latest news, newspapers, magazines, and websites running and re-running pictures of dramatic and incessant acts of violence carried out by these ferocious group. Major initiatives to combat the nuclear proliferation and domestic terrorist threats posed by the 'Boko Haram' group have been launched by the Federal Government and international security institutions. In fact, considerable amount of money and political capital have been committed to new and continuing programmes to enhance nuclear security. Although, these and other efforts are worthy of support, it is not obvious that they reflect any clear ordering of priorities, or that they are being implemented with a sense of urgency. In order to correct this situation, this paper explicates the issue of Boko Haram domestic terrorism in Nigeria, taking an in-depth look at the historical antecedents, motivations, objectives and structures that can help in preventing them. This paper concludes with the advocacy of how citizens can assist in checking the menace of Boko Haram crises in the country in order to tackle these monstrous groups whose callous activities have become a hydra in Nigeria.
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| 2 |
ID:
128301
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the effects the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is having on Al Qaeda Central. To that end, it constructs a theoretical model to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda's capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Although the results of one single empirical case cannot be generalised, they nonetheless constitute a preliminary element for the construction of a broader theoretical framework concerning the use of armed drones as part of a counterterrorism strategy.
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| 3 |
ID:
119400
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Long gone . . . is the inbred elite connivance between Paris and the francophone capitals in Africa.
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| 4 |
ID:
170795
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The Islamic State (IS) terror group continues to operate and endure
five years after its founding in 2014 and after the loss of its caliphate in
March this year. The IS has also endured the killings of its Caliph Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi in October and other senior leaders in the last few
years. A factor in the resilience of the IS is the nature of its organisational
structure – which is quite ambiguous, with no clear hierarchy – that is
not severely affected by leadership decapitations or territorial losses.
However, a larger force behind its survival is its ideological appeal and
emphasis on using violence to achieve its ends. The IS has invested a
lot of resources and expertise in propagating and micromanaging its
ideological message across the jihadist landscape. The ideology of the
IS – a mix of Salafi-jihadism, Sunni extremism and a nihilistic outlook
– has found resonance among radical sympathisers worldwide and
had managed to bridge the gap between jihadist thought and action by
establishing a functioning Islamic caliphate in 2014, something that no
other Islamist terror group had been able to do
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| 5 |
ID:
103899
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2011.
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It has been a staple assumption that terrorists 'do not want a place at the table: they want to shatter the table'. Across policymakers, academia and a wider commentariat, this position - that negotiation with the 'new' Islamist terrorist actor is both impossible and, anyway, highly undesirable - is so commonplace that the question has scarcely been raised. But is it true? The article considers the five pillars on which the no-negotiation position rests. First, 'rationality': are terrorists pathologically mad or fanatical? Second, 'viability': are there common interests or is this a zero-sum game? Third, 'representation': can terrorists fit into a diplomatic system recognising representative parties? Fourth, 'legitimacy': can diplomacy, as a system of norms, conventions and practices be applied to agents who reject this system wholesale? Fifth, 'preferability': even if possible, is it either strategically or ethically right to do so? The case on this question should not be closed yet.
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| 6 |
ID:
128305
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2014.
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After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.
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| 7 |
ID:
123679
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| 8 |
ID:
129503
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2014.
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In the course of the last few years, the Islamic sect Boko Haram has become of great interest to academics, researchers and analysts. At the same time, experts, especially at the European Union (EU) level, have been reluctant to include Boko Haram in the EU list of terrorist organisations, despite the fact that this group has clearly demonstrated its transformation into a terrorist organisation. Security challenges and threats are, by definition, subject to change, and it is the task of security institutions to create policies to address these challenges and threats. Terrorism cannot be addressed in isolation, and policymakers are confronted at all levels with the difficult task of making sense of this evolution. By assessing the current security situation in Nigeria, this commentary tries to ascertain the potential repercussions to regional stability from the Boko Haram phenomenon. Insurgencies have often been initiated from and supported by neighbouring countries and have expanded conflicts across borders. Countering Boko Haram will require various institutions to conduct similar and concurrent counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist operations. At the global level, such co-ordination has often proven difficult. The EU has to keep the pace in this case.
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| 9 |
ID:
109236
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