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ID:
128003
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Fukushima disaster has lead the French government to release novel cost information relative to its nuclear electricity program allowing us to compute a levelized cost. We identify a modest escalation of capital cost and a larger than expected operational cost. Under the best scenario, the cost of French nuclear power over the last four decades is View the MathML source (at 2010 prices) while in the worst case it is View the MathML source. On the basis of these findings, we estimate the future cost of nuclear power in France to be at least View the MathML source and possibly View the MathML source. A comparison with the US confirms that French nuclear electricity nevertheless remains cheaper. Comparisons with coal, natural gas and wind power are carried out to find the advantage of these.
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| 2 |
ID:
115787
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| 3 |
ID:
160903
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States’ grand strategy has consistently been marked by a distinct tendency toward nuclear hypertrophy. Especially the inherent difficulties in extending deterrence to its allies and friends, compounded by the geopolitical characteristics of the US as an unassailable ‘insular’ fortress off Eurasia, have generated, rather paradoxically, a strong incentive for Washington to pursue a wide margin of nuclear superiority, if not nuclear primacy. This has implied, in turn, the deployment of redundant arsenals, robust counterforce capabilities and even a ballistic missile defence. Significantly, not even the Obama administration, though solemnly committed to nuclear disarmament, abstained from embracing a very ambitious modernisation program of American nuclear forces.
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| 4 |
ID:
186374
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| Summary/Abstract |
Starting around a decade or so ago, the law of armed conflict (LOAC) acquired new prominence in the development of US nuclear strategy. This was stimulated in part by a series of major intergovernmental conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which led to a consensus among a group of nations that the use of nuclear weapons would result in catastrophic and unacceptable human suffering and was therefore incompatible with the LOAC.1 This argument has been a key rationale for efforts to prohibit nuclear weapons, including the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which as of early 2022 had 86 signatories and 59 states parties.
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| 5 |
ID:
110595
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In November 2010, as the Senate neared the end of its debate on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the Obama administration submitted to Congress an update to its "1251 report," outlining how it planned to maintain and modernize U.S. strategic nuclear forces under the treaty.
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| 6 |
ID:
103977
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