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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
187391
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| Summary/Abstract |
How can areas of potential agreement be identified and endorsed by citizens in protracted conflicts? In an effort to answer this question, the article introduces a conjoint experiment across the ethnically and territorially split communities of Cyprus and tests a range of hypotheses about the structure of public opinion with respect to a future settlement. We test hypotheses on security and credible commitments, the legacy of past negotiations, as well as transitional justice mechanisms following United Nations plans to mediate the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) exists from a public opinion perspective. We specifically explore power-sharing in the context of security, provisions for the internally displaced, federal courts, and territorial readjustments and highlight their relative importance for public opinion interventions across conflict-ridden societies.
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| 2 |
ID:
106036
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fate of missing persons is a central issue in post-conflict societies facing truth recovery and human rights dilemmas. Despite widespread public sympathy towards relatives, societies emerging from conflict often defer the recovery of missing for decades. More paradoxically, in post-1974 Cyprus, the official authorities delayed unilateral exhumations of victims buried within cemeteries in their own jurisdiction. Analysis of official post-1974 discourses reveals a Greek-Cypriot consensus to emphasise the issue as one of Turkish aggression, thus downplaying in-group responsibilities and the legacy of intra-communal violence. We compare the experience of Cyprus with other post-conflict societies such as Spain, Northern Ireland, and Mozambique and explore the linkages between institutions and beliefs about transitional justice. We argue that elite consensus initiates and facilitates the transition to democracy but often leads to the institutionalisation of groups opposing truth recovery even for in-group members.
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| 3 |
ID:
104053
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among two conflictual dyads, namely Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan. It draws from the International Crisis Behaviour dataset to present a new sub-dataset of 12 interstate crises involving the two dyads in the period 1987 to 2002. While crisis behaviour in Greece-Turkey has frequently been analysed within the context of two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian-Pakistani crises have been studied within the perspective of nuclear proliferation. To examine the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. Using Ragin's (2000) comparative qualitative analysis, it demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary theory explain crisis escalation, although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of error. Moreover, the article demonstrates that Greek-Turkish crises have generally escalated to relatively low levels of conflict (threat of war or show of force), while Indian-Pakistani crises have spiralled to higher levels of confrontation (use of force). In both dyads, nuclear weapons and regional organizations have shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The EU and NATO have contributed to mitigating crisis escalation and the use of force between the Aegean neighbours, while unintentionally encouraging low intensity confrontations; meanwhile, in South Asia, nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic regimes have exacerbated crises, particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare.
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| 4 |
ID:
177735
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article interrogates a tension at the heart of the principle of accountability: accountability as a principle of non-impunity of public officials versus accountability as a form of bureaucratic organisation and control. Although these dimensions are distinguishable in the abstract, their ambiguity has led to an expectations gap among both citizens and elites. The historical legacies of previous policies can exacerbate this expectations gap, leading to a variety of value trade-offs, with the potential to undermine other political values, such as political learning, consensus-building, and citizens' rights. We present examples of the trade-offs resulting from this expectations gap, focusing on moments of crisis in which such trade-offs can be seen most acutely, and highlight its role as a vehicle of global populism.
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| 5 |
ID:
183957
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| Summary/Abstract |
For decades, the UN has failed to mediate a settlement in Cyprus because of a general and profound weakness: it is unable, outside of unity and resolve in the Security Council, to offer direct incentives to parties in conflict that would shape their calculus towards conflict resolution, or to control the actions of third parties in a way that would incentivize conflict resolution or prevent disincentives. In the resulting vacuum, the prospects for peace settlements come to rest largely on domestic politics within the contesting camps and, sometimes relatedly, on the balance of power between them. In the case of Cyprus, the article claims that these weaknesses on the part of the UN were clearly on display during the negotiation process surrounding the Annan Plan (2001–04) and the resumed process that began in 2008 and ended at Crans-Montana in 2017.
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