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| 1 |
ID:
110283
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| 2 |
ID:
104088
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article posits that Alfred Thayer Mahan supplies the "logic" of Chinese maritime strategy, urging Beijing to amass commercial and naval fleets, international commerce, and forward naval stations-the trappings of sea power. Mao Zedong provides the "grammar" by which the People's Liberation Army will prosecute naval operations offshore. The article ranks Wayne Hughes's three generic models of fleet tactics according to Chinese strategic preferences, concluding that Chinese commanders incline to dispersed attack, sequential attack, and massed attack, in that order. By acquainting themselves with Chinese preferences, U.S. naval commanders can glimpse how this prospective naval adversary will wage war.
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| 3 |
ID:
140622
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean is wider especially for economic development and the regional integration and subsequently, to establish military base in the IOR. However, India’s plan in the IOR is to counter China’s growing maritime power in the region. Therefore, in this direction, India has a pragmatic strategy for the regional engagement with all. But balancing China’s economic and military intrusion in the region is formidable and more complex challenge. The fact of the important matter is that India should have more purposeful and clear engagement in Indian Ocean without feeling China as a challenge. India needs to materialize its capabilities and skillful maneuverability in bringing the island nations of the Indian Ocean into its periphery of influence boosting and building confidence building for the greater consolidation of bilateralism and multilateralism wherever possible in the direction of security and economy. However, to accomplish the set objectives in the Indian Ocean, the region must be a zone of peace for the protection of national interests of all the states. In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to argue that the rise in China’s maritime profile in the Indian Ocean has compelled India to focus on its proactive maritime strategy.
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| 4 |
ID:
146448
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| Summary/Abstract |
What are the drivers behind China’s vigorous pursuit of sea power? What are the interests Beijing seeks to advance by building a powerful bluewater navy and the world’s largest coast guard? What are the principles that guide its use of sea power in pursuit of its national interest? How are China’s state objectives, and approaches to pursuing them, evolving over time?
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| 5 |
ID:
160794
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| Summary/Abstract |
The increasing Chinese naval presence in and around Indian ocean, coupled with the rise of the home-grown Indian Navy and the US naval dominance over the global commons, has brought about a strategic maritime triangle in the Indian Ocean. This article looks into the evolving role, capacity and objectives of the Indian, Chinese and US Navy vis-à-vis their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. The article argues that the ascendency of China’s naval prowess in Indian Ocean will prod India to opt for a tactical naval entente with the USA. Few impediments to the potential formation of a close-knit Indo-US partnership like India’s fear of losing strategic autonomy, its aversion in being an east Asian naval power, US–Pakistan ties and the difference in the Indian and USA’s interpretation of the concept of ‘Freedom of Navigation’ have been discussed. The article contends that an effective Indo-US naval cooperation will depend on how these impediments are taken into considerations within the make-up of their partnership.
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