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ID:
104181
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 7 May 2008, Dmitrii Medvedev was sworn in as the third President of the Russian Federation. Under his two predecessors, the relationship between Moscow and the regions had undergone cataclysmic changes. Boris Yel'tsin's rule had ushered in a period of unprecedented, albeit unsystematic and ad hoc, decentralisation (Teague 199458. Teague, E. 1994. "'Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation'". In (1994) National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia , Edited by: Sporzluk, R. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
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| 2 |
ID:
129596
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The aim of this article is to examine what the geopolitics of the Arctic look like as seen from the largest Arctic state. How are narratives about the development of the region received, reworked and produced in a Russian context? We find that Russian policy actors distance themselves from discourses of Arctic conflict and geopolitical competition, and examine how this approach may serve some of Russia's key interests in the region. We further argue that the key tension in the Arctic region is not along the conflict/cooperation axis, but rather lies in the tricky process of delineating between international cooperation and national sovereignty in tackling Arctic problems. In attempting to illustrate the various voices, ideas and interests that shape Russia's policy understanding of the Arctic and its challenges and opportunities, we draw upon a media analysis and a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the five Arctic states.
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| 3 |
ID:
179204
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Do authoritarian regimes engage in active export of their political systems? Or are they primarily concerned about their geopolitical interests? This article explores these questions by examining Russia’s policy towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. In all three de facto states, Moscow is fully able to dictate election outcomes should it desire to, but, we argue, has increasingly refrained from doing so. These client states are unlikely to attempt to escape from Russia’s tutelage; and with its geopolitical interests fully ensured, Russia appears willing to grant them latitude. We then ask whether these findings can be extrapolated to serve as a template for understanding Russia’s policy towards its client states more generally, discussing Moscow’s reactions to attempted regime change in Armenia and Belarus.
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