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ID:
157296
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article empirically evaluates whether the adoption of market mechanisms such as auction, tender and quotation for land-use rights acquisition effectively reduces illegal land use in China. It is based on official statistics of (i) illegal land use cases and areas; and (ii) adoption rate of market-led transactions in 30 provinces from 1999 to 2008. A fixed effects panel model is used to control for factors like land revenue dependency, law enforcement, per capita gross domestic product, government size, real estate investment, relative wage in public sector and citizens’ level of education. The findings demonstrate that the market mechanism is effective in reducing illegal land use. However, the Chinese government needs to close legal and institutional loopholes in the land administration regime in order to improve the effectiveness of market-led transactions in reducing land corruption.
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| 2 |
ID:
104203
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines definitions of Chinese corruption. While many Chinese corruption studies have argued that Chinese corruption has its own unique features, our review of definitions of Chinese corruption featured in current academic literature reveals that most definitions in use are similar to the general definition of corruption: abuse of public office for private gains. Valuable as it is, such a general definition does not adequately specify the actors, behavior and motives in Chinese corruption. This paper argues that actors in Chinese corruption are not limited to employees in the public sector but also include any Chinese state functionary engaging in public activities. In addition, corrupt behavior refers to both economic (embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, and bribery) and disciplinary corruption (violation of social norms and the dereliction of duty) that are damaging to public interests. In doing so, this paper finds that even behavior such as the dereliction of duty and violations of social norms, that is not motivated by private gain, is regarded as corruption in China. We also discuss the political nature of this broadly defined Chinese corruption.
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