| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores whether the IAEA intelligence apparatus is being stymied by divisions between IAEA member states over how to respond to cases of non-compliance. The first part of the paper charts the key developments in the Department of Safeguards since the early 1990s - all of them authorized by the Board of Governors - that have increased the Secretariat's technical ability and legal authority to acquire and analyze evidence of illicit nuclear activities. The second part of the paper explores some of the political difficulties associated with implementing this expanded mandate and using it to hold states to account, drawing primarily on the IAEA Syria file. This case study indicates that however technically proficient and proactive IAEA monitoring becomes, reliable intelligence will not necessarily improve the global nuclear governance unless member states accept IAEA intrusiveness and develop a common understanding of proliferation threats and the need to deal with them decisively.
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