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ID:
122299
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Scholars tend to pessimistically argue that the weaker a regime is the harder it becomes for international actors to coerce it to fight the terrorist groups that it harbors/sponsors, since weak regimes are afraid that taking such an unpopular step could critically undermine their stability. Yet, this argument ignores the policy option that the coercing actor has of threatening to take steps which would undermine the stability of the weak regime unless it ceases its support for terrorist groups. Such a regime-threatening coercive strategy can overcome the problem of the weak regime's lack of political incentives because if the threat is credible, even a weak regime may conclude that it is politically cheaper to suppress the terrorists than face an externally triggered regime destabilization. Since weak regimes often care more about their survival than about national security interests, the regime-threatening coercive strategy has the best chances for success against such regimes. This article presents three different regime-threatening military coercive strategies and explores the conditions under which they are likely to be successful.
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2 |
ID:
104248
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3 |
ID:
177513
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Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of World War II, several local actors have tried to gain regional dominance in the Middle East. These attempts have met with varying levels of success. This study seeks to explain this variation. We will not address the equally important question of when and why specific states decide to make bids for regional dominance. We maintain that while realism is a useful theoretical lens for explaining this variation, it is necessary to adjust some realist assumptions slightly to make realism work well in the Middle Eastern context. This is so because realism was developed based on modern European and American experiences. Specifically, our adjustments of realism's assumptions produced the following three preconditions that must be met for a local actor's bid to succeed. First, one must pursue those types of power which are the most potent at a specific time given the Middle Eastern environment. Second, while traditional realists recommend forging large coalitions by reducing threat perception and making bargains through traditional diplomacy or Realpolitik, we argue that domination through subversion or intimidation is more effective. Third, one must not only avoid counterproductive intervention by the great powers, but also have them actively on one's side.
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