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ZHUANG, JUN
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
149777
Does New Rural Pension Scheme decrease elderly labor supply? evidence from CHARLS
/ Ning, Manxiu; Gong, Jinquan ; Zheng, Xuhui ; Zhuang, Jun
Zhuang, Jun
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
This paper examines the effect of the New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS) on the labor supply behavior of the elderly in rural China. Using pooled data from two waves of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS) and an analytical framework of combination of regression discontinuity design and difference in difference method (RD-DiD), we find no evidence that pension receipt from the NRPS program does significantly induce the elderly to withdraw from the labor market. The heterogeneous effects by health status indicate that pension recipient slightly decreases the probability of labor force participation for those individuals with chronic diseases; however, the effect is not statistically significant. The empirical findings suggest that the introduction of the NRPS program does not improve the welfare effect of the originally targeted elder individuals with illness.
Key Words
Labor Supply
;
Difference In Difference
;
Regression Discontinuity Design
;
New Rural Pension Scheme
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2
ID:
104336
Secrecy and deception at equilibrium, with applications to anti
/ Zhuang, Jun; Bier, Vicki M
Zhuang, Jun
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2011.
Summary/Abstract
In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model for whether and how a first mover should disclose her resource allocation. Our model allows us to explore whether the first mover should disclose correct information about her resource allocation, incorrect information, or no information. Although we study secrecy and deception specifically in the homeland-security context where the first mover is assumed to be the defender, our work can also provide insights in other contexts, such as business competition.
Key Words
Terrorism
;
Game Theory
;
Deception
;
Anti-Terrorism
;
Homeland Security
;
Resource allocation
;
Secrecy
;
Truthful Disclosure
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