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ID:
104349
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines to what extent the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) has moved beyond dialogue to practical security co-operation. Focusing on terrorism, maritime security and disaster relief as key areas of ARF activities in the past few years, the paper offers four arguments: first, while the ARF primarily remains a forum for regional security dialogues and confidence building, its participants have slowly become prepared to proceed with practical security co-operation, albeit only in limited ways. To the extent that desktop and field exercises take place under ARF auspices, most have been organized in the area of disaster relief. This implies, second, that for the most part ARF participants are still pursuing capacity building and operational security responses outside the Forum. Third, the ARF's cautious embrace of practical co-operation is not the outcome of ASEAN's exercise of diplomatic centrality but the result of initiatives pursued by a small group of ASEAN and some non-ASEAN states. Fourth, at least in the short term, any expectations that participants might organize significantly more demanding practical activities under ARF auspices are premature.
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| 2 |
ID:
132452
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| 3 |
ID:
172097
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the crisis in the Sudan unfolded after the overthrow of long time President Omar al-Bashir, the Director of the East African Standby Force (EASF) purportedly made a statement to the effect that the force was ready to intervene should the situation become genocidal. Using the case of its failed intervention in Burundi crisis, this article argues that the EASF deployment in the Sudan would generally not be feasible for reasons including: the government of the Sudan would not consent to the intervention; the ongoing dialogue between the warring parties would preclude any intervention; and the lack of capacity of the force to actually deploy. From its failed deployment in Burundi, these lessons can be discerned: first, that for any deployment of the EASF to be authorised, the policy organs especially of the AU must be aligned in their understanding of the situation. Secondly, where there are alternative means of dealing with the situation, military intervention would not be authorised. Lastly, that consent of the host state must be procured before deployment is undertaken out of respect for the principle of sovereignty.
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