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| 1 |
ID:
171676
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines a double discourse by the Palestinian leadership, one in English and one in Arabic, which plays a central role in their negotiating strategy with Israel since the onset of the Oslo ‘peace process’ (1993). Using language very close to Western terminology, Palestinians in English speak of ‘Occupation’ and ‘Settlements’ with the 1967 borders as the defining issue; while in Arabic, they speak of ‘Occupation’ and ‘Settlements’ in terms of the 1948 borders (i.e., all of Israel is an ‘Occupation’ and Tel Aviv is an illegal ‘settlement’). As a zero-sum negotiating strategy this makes perfect sense: convince Israel to concede ‘land for peace’ (1967 borders), when in reality this means ‘land for war’ (1967 borders as launching pad for war to 1948 borders). The western news media, allegedly committed to accurate reporting, shows no knowledge of the Arabic discourse and presents what Palestinians say in English as reliable reflections of their actions and intentions. As a result of this failure to identify the double-discourse, the Western legacy media presents Palestinian war propaganda as news to their Western audiences, unwittingly helping the Palestinians in their deception.
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| 2 |
ID:
157525
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Oslo peace process created a Palestinian police force for the purposes of law enforcement and preventing terrorism. However, Israel soon accused the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of creating a paramilitary force as a means to spoil the peace process and achieve by force what it could not through negotiations. Others argued that PLO chair Yasir 'Arafat was engaged in coupproofing the fledgling Palestinian Authority (PA). This article proposes that the PLO's weapons proliferation was meant as an insurance policy to deter Israel from reoccupying the Palestinian Territories.
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| 3 |
ID:
162645
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| Summary/Abstract |
There are two principal reasons behind the lack of success in reaching a final peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, namely, the malfunctioning negotiations’ framework from one side and the complexity of the negotiated issues from the other. This article is mainly addressing the bilateral framework’s flaws when it comes to the Oslo accords and the way the two negotiating parties have perceived them. It is an attempt to overhaul the existing Oslo peace process and not to create a new one. Oslo process has become entrenched over more than twenty years of different practices and legal realities. The article is also introducing a negotiating framework that combines the benefits of a multilateral regional track to the Oslo process aiming to redress the latent structural flaws. It is intended not to tackle the final status issues, as there is a plethora of literature doing so. The extensive focus on those complicated issues without redressing the process’ structural flaws has led partially to the current stalemate. The role of any mediator or external partner is not to solve those issues on behalf of the principal parties, but to work on the negotiating framework and the process itself.
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| 4 |
ID:
121452
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the near 20 years since the Oslo peace process began, Palestinians have suffered losses-socially, economically and politically-arguably not seen since 1948. This altered reality has, in recent years, been shaped by critical paradigm shifts in the way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is understood and addressed. These shifts, particularly with regard to international acceptance of Palestine's territorial fragmentation, the imperative of ending Israel's occupation, the de facto annexation of West Bank lands to Israel, and the transformation of Palestinians into a humanitarian issue-have redefined the way the world views the conflict, diminishing the possibility of a political resolution.
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| 5 |
ID:
171580
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| 6 |
ID:
104396
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