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| 1 |
ID:
133289
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2013 intensified international scrutiny of the war against Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen (Movement of the Warrior Youth). This article analyses the current state of affairs with reference to the three principal sets of actors in this war: Al-Shabaab, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its international partners, and the various actors currently involved in building the Somali Federal Government's security forces. It argues that although the newly reconfigured Al-Shabaab poses a major tactical threat in Somalia and across the wider Horn of Africa, the movement is becoming a less important actor in Somalia's national politics. As Al-Shabaab loses territory and its popularity among Somalis continues to dwindle, other clan- and region-based actors will become more salient as national debates over federalism, the decentralization of governance mechanisms beyond Mogadishu and the place of clannism will occupy centre stage. As a consequence, AMISOM's principal roles should gradually shift from degrading Al-Shabaab towards a broader stabilization agenda: encouraging a national consensus over how to build effective governance structures; developing an effective set of Somali National Security Forces; and ensuring that the Federal Government delivers services and effective governance to its citizens, especially beyond Mogadishu in the settlements recently captured from Al-Shabaab. As it stands, however, AMISOM is not prepared to carry out these activities. More worryingly, nor is the Somali Federal Government.
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| 2 |
ID:
154380
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| Summary/Abstract |
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an atypical peace support operation (PSO) that has evolved sui generis and continues to chart its own trajectory politically and militarily. With a view to contributing to the African Union (AU) Commission’s policymaking process and articulation of its PSO doctrine, this article examines AMISOM’s various distinct features, especially as they relate to the mandating process, mission support arrangements, and interactions with the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). The article argues that there is a clear need for the AU to articulate a PSO doctrine appropriate to the types of missions which the AU undertakes, both now and in the near future. AMISOM’s initial mandating process was event-driven rather than context-driven, and the mission operated was based on a logistic supply arrangement that was at times not in sync with its overall operational demands. While the mission has multifaceted interactions with the SNSF, the interplay was fragmented, not least due to a multiplicity of actors and interests. A reading of the AMISOM experience underlines that the design of the AU’s contemporary peace missions’ doctrine should be centred on an integrated and mutually-reinforcing relationship among operations, institution-building, logistical support, and politics.
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| 3 |
ID:
165974
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Somalia, for many analysts, is the paradigmatic ‘failed state’, as well as the site of numerous external interventions since 1991. However, while early interventions were designed and directed by international actors, more recent peace operations have been led by regional states. The current African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has been presented by its supporters and financiers as a novel ‘African solution’ to a putative ‘African problem’. This article seeks to challenge analyses of AMISOM and other African peace operations that contrast ‘international’ approaches with ‘local’ or ‘African’ approaches, focusing instead on the region as a unit of analysis. In doing so, the study uses archival and interview data to interrogate how regional politico-military elites have viewed Somalia, their role within it and the kind of political authority they have wished to see established there since the genesis of AMISOM. The article finds that regional elites have sought to use AMISOM to impose a particular version of statehood on Somalia, based in both neo-Weberian institutionalist theory and their own domestic political experiences. This has entailed not only the rejection of central manifestations of Somali political authority but also the regional construction of Somalia itself as a failed state.
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| 4 |
ID:
144184
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Since mid-2013 AMISOM has undergone a series of strategic reviews aimed at strengthening the mission, and since early 2014 it has conducted four major operations aimed at taking the fight to Al-Shabaab. Although these operations have enjoyed some successes, AMISOM continued to confront four major challenges that badly hindered its ability to achieve its mandated tasks. Paul D Williams explores these challenges – both internal and external to AMISOM – and argues that AMISOM cannot be expected to implement a successful exit strategy unless these issues are addressed.
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| 5 |
ID:
139118
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| Summary/Abstract |
From 2006 to 2011, al Qaeda's East African proxy, al Shabaab, served as de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al Shabaab and the Burundian and Ugandan Peacekeepers of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery, or development. Beginning in August 2011, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al Shabaab from Mogadishu, then subsequently, Kismayo, and ultimately to consolidate and reorganize in the Somali hinterland. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the newly recognized Somali Federal Government (SFG), neutralize al Shabaab, and provide good governance to its constituents. Al Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and their offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamic extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the Western Indian Ocean, destabilize East Africa, and adversely impact millions.
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| 6 |
ID:
129606
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| 7 |
ID:
144185
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From uncertain beginnings, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has grown, over almost ten years, into the regional organisation's largest peace-support operation. Bolstered by a multilayered mission architecture through which the UN and bilateral donors provide financial, logistical and technical support, it has achieved important gains against the jihadi Islamist organisation Al-Shabaab. The apparent viability of these partnerships has seen AMISOM hailed as a successful model of collaboration between regional and international structures. Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein examine a less-studied dimension of this model, namely the intersection of these arrangements with the structural fragmentation that has increasingly come to define the mission.
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| 8 |
ID:
186076
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Through the case of the Sierra Leonean deployment on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), this study argues that family-related stress is an often-overlooked challenge in peacekeeping deployments. Using in-depth interviews with Sierra Leonean soldiers who were part of the deployment, military decision makers, and foreign advisors, this article lays out specific factors that created family-related tensions and contributed to lowered morale for Sierra Leonean peacekeepers. It demonstrates that the family-related stress on deployment is not only an issue of family separation, it is entangled with the historic trajectories of the armed forces and the sending country’s socio-economic conditions. The focus on Sierra Leone highlights the additional and unique burdens that soldiers and their families may endure in troop contributions from lower-income countries.
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| 9 |
ID:
129498
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From 2006 to 2011, al-Qaeda's East African proxy, al-Shabaab, served as the de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al-Shabaab and the peacekeeping force of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery or development. By 2012, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the TFG in neutralising al-Shabaab throughout Somalia and providing good governance to its constituents. Al-Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and its offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamist extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the western Indian Ocean, destabilise East Africa and adversely impact millions.
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| 10 |
ID:
104455
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rampant piracy off the Somalia coast has brought the strife-ridden country back into attention. Economic hardship, and a deep resentment and anger against foreign exploitation of Somalia's maritime resources, have inspired the pirates to declare themselves 'coast guards of Somalia'. However, the growing attacks by the pirates have had an adverse impact on global commercial shipping. The international community has responded to this predicament by massive naval deployments in the Gulf of Aden. This article argues that the long-term solution to piracy on the high seas off Somalia lies in addressing the chaos on shore. Such an approach, however, is strewn with numerous challenges. The role of external actors like Ethiopia, Eritrea and the United States has contributed to the instability. The growing division and infighting between Somalian Islamists, violations of the UN arms embargo and insufficient influence of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have further exacerbated the problems.
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| 11 |
ID:
131136
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From late 2012, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had adopted a largely defensive posture, citing limited resources as the principal reason for this. However, increasing numbers of Al-Shabaab attacks both inside and outside Somalia have forced AMISOM and its partners to open a new phase in the war against the group. To that end, in November 2013 the UN Security Council called for AMISOM to be enhanced in several areas and in January 2014 the mission adopted a new Concept of Operations. These developments facilitated a new wave of offensive operations conducted in tandem with the Somali National Security Forces. Nevertheless, AMISOM still confronts some familiar - and fundamental - challenges in its efforts to stabilise Somalia.
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| 12 |
ID:
146428
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been fighting a violent campaign to reclaim territory held by jihadist militants known as al-Shabaab. Military successes, including the liberation of a number of Somali cities from the insurgent group’s control, have generated considerable optimism that al-Shabaab is on the decline.
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