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| 1 |
ID:
138738
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| Summary/Abstract |
The U.S. decision to draw down its forces by December 2014 forced India to re-align its Afghanistan policy to assert its own interests. India’s on-the-ground exposure of US$2 billion and anticipation of the fallout from Pakistan-nurtured radical Islamic terrorist groups will guide the Modi government.
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| 2 |
ID:
167269
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| 3 |
ID:
104543
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| 4 |
ID:
158131
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| Summary/Abstract |
India and China possess a robust dispute redressal mechanism erected over a period of time but Doklam was an altogether different challenge. The unprecedented clash involved Indian and Chinese troops facing off on the soil of a third country which may yet give rise to future complications. During the standoff, Chinese propaganda machinery issued repeated threats of breaching India’s boundary through Pakistan occupied Kashmir.
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| 5 |
ID:
161447
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| Summary/Abstract |
India's relations with the Gulf countries started to flourish in the 1990s after India succeeded in de-hyphenating Pakistan from its policy toward the Gulf. Though Pakistan remained a factor as it continued to raise Kashmir and internal situation in India at multilateral forums such as OIC to evoke anti-India sentiments, it did not remain an underlying factor in as was the case during the Cold War era. In the contemporary dynamics, when India-Gulf relations are progressing toward strategic partnerships, Pakistan has re-emerged as a factor but its nature has changed. As highlighted in the joint statements issued during the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visits to the Gulf countries since May 2014, India can now put pressure on Pakistan by highlighting its policy of sponsoring terrorism. This was evident when the Arab Gulf countries condemned the Pathankot (January 2016) and Uri (September 2016) terrorist attacks. India's relations with the Arab Gulf and other Middle Eastern countries are independent of their engagements with Pakistan and India-Pakistan tension, but New Delhi has stepped up efforts to raise the issue of cross-border terrorism and use of religion to incite terror activities against India during its engagements with these countries. It underlines the growing convergence between India and Arab Gulf countries over regional issues and the ability of India to isolate Pakistan over issues related to terrorism.
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| 6 |
ID:
148431
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| 7 |
ID:
138398
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| Summary/Abstract |
As India’s economic growth keeps pace at a high rate, energy consumption and demand too has increased rapidly. Being a country that is not very rich in oil and gas reserves, the dependence of India on imported sources of energy is only bound to increase if it is to keep fuelling its growth story.
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| 8 |
ID:
139616
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May 2014 Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in the wake of a historic electoral victory. He has generated two kinds of expectations: on the one hand, his voters expect him to create millions of new jobs for a fast-growing working age population; on the other hand, Hindu extremists hope that he will pursue an aggressive policy aimed at ‘hinduising’ India’s society. The first months of his premiership show that Modi is acting in both spheres, while pursuing a radical centralisation of power in his hands.
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| 9 |
ID:
162868
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| 10 |
ID:
138130
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| Summary/Abstract |
Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature. The 2005 Agreement on the ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India–China Boundary Question’ acknowledged as much: the ‘two sides are seeking a political settlement of the boundary question’.2 In future India–China boundary negotiations, will the two leaders go for territorial exchange or will they remain content with the status quo, and simply define the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?
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| 11 |
ID:
122429
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| 12 |
ID:
153993
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| Summary/Abstract |
The noted Indian foreign policy analyst, C. Raja Mohan, in a 2015 book, Modi's World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence, argued that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had ushered in a “third republic” in terms of the conduct of India's foreign policy. His basic argument was that Modi had fundamentally reinvigorated India’s foreign policy, finally shedding many of the shibboleths that had previously hobbled the country's foreign policy choices. Among these, of course, was the hoary commitment to nonalignment and then its subsequent incarnation, “strategic autonomy.” He also contended that India was now in the process of dispensing with the visceral, reflexive anti-American streak that had long characterized its foreign policy.
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| 13 |
ID:
142842
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| Summary/Abstract |
While the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) alone enjoys a majority in the current Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), it lacks numbers in the Rajya Sabha (upper house). This paper examines how the opposition mobilised, especially in the Rajya Sabha, to counter some of the Modi government's legislative agenda during its first year, and the government's response of promulgating ordinances. A particular focus is on the issue of amending the 2013 land acquisition legislation passed by the previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. The paper also considers Modi's speeches inside and outside parliament. His articulation of the government's agenda, particularly on land acquisition, and his views on the role of the opposition are analysed. The paper makes two broad arguments. First, the Rajya Sabha was possibly reclaiming some of its functions, as envisioned by India's Constituent Assembly, in bringing a ‘balance’ to legislative decision-making. India's political evolution, from a one-party dominant system to one with several strong regional parties, has meant a changed role for the Rajya Sabha. Second, in its parliamentary discourse, Modi and the BJP were caught in the contradictory positions of battling the perception that they were too close to corporate interests, even as they attempted to project an inclusive and pro-poor image.
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| 14 |
ID:
192432
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| Summary/Abstract |
WHETHER the Anglo-Saxons and the collective West that surrendered to them without a murmur would impose their diktat on the rest of the world and, having destroyed Russia, teach a lesson to countries that pursue their own nationally oriented foreign policy has become an existential question during the special Military Operation (SMO). The position of India, one of the biggest countries on our planet, confirms that this Anglo-Saxon undertaking is doomed to failure.
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| 15 |
ID:
145450
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| Summary/Abstract |
While India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party lost elections in Delhi and Bihar, and its government failed to implement any significant reform in 2015, the economy was slowly recovering and Prime Minister Narendra Modi conducted an active foreign policy.
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| 16 |
ID:
172475
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| Summary/Abstract |
The major development in India in 2019 was the national election which returned Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party to power with a larger majority and which, along with post-election ideological assertiveness, poses the question of whether India’s party system is a new one-party hegemony, this time of the Bharatiya Janata.
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| 17 |
ID:
179258
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| Summary/Abstract |
The year 2020 was one of multiple challenges for India and for the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party government. The year began with mass protests against the Citizen (Amendment) Act, which minority Muslims saw as threatening their citizen rights and was widely felt to be unconstitutional, and ended with mass protests by farmers against market-oriented farm reforms. The coronavirus pandemic arrived in January and by the end of the year had caused the world’s second-largest caseload (10.3 million infections) and 149,000 deaths. The government responded with a strict lockdown, resulting in a severe economic contraction, although the economy and foreign investment picked up in the last quarter, buoyed by vaccine hopes and a partial economic recovery. On the foreign front, Chinese incursions in June along the Line of Actual Control, the de facto border, led to a tense standoff that remained unresolved at year-end. Politically, the BJP remained not only entrenched but somewhat further empowered against a weak and divided opposition, with Modi’s popularity ratings high.
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| 18 |
ID:
185211
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| Summary/Abstract |
A positive start to 2021 ended abruptly when the Delta variant of COVID-19 swept over India, killing millions. Since peaking in May, the pandemic has abated, and the government has vaccinated a large share of the population. The Bharatiya Janata Party continues to dominate the country’s politics, having centralized power further despite a lackluster performance in state elections. The economy recovered vigorously from its COVID-induced recession of 2020, but it is unclear whether growth will return to the 8–9% annual rates witnessed in the 2000s. India is more bogged down in its neighborhood than before: it has been unable to retrieve the territory it lost to China last year, and the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban threatens an increase in terrorism in Kashmir. The country is at a crossroads, and much will depend on how the relatively unfettered senior leadership of the BJP responds to these challenges
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| 19 |
ID:
190030
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| Summary/Abstract |
India continued its recovery from COVID-19 in 2022. The Omicron strain was less lethal than previous waves and consequently had a smaller economic footprint. The economy began rebounding, with trade and foreign direct and portfolio investments recovering to pre-pandemic levels. India remained one of the fastest-growing economies in the world in 2022. However, it suffered very significant setbacks to its democracy, with increased attacks on civil and political liberties and human rights, and on its institutions, by BJP-led governments at the center and in the states. India effectively managed foreign policy challenges stemming from the Ukraine–Russia conflict, incursions into Indian territory by China, and the Islamophobic rhetoric of its own party leaders. Overall, 2022 was marked by a slew of BJP victories in six out of seven states and by the negative consequences of the BJP’s political strength for Indian democracy.
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| 20 |
ID:
138547
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| Summary/Abstract |
India and the United States in late January reached what President Barack Obama described as a “breakthrough understanding” on two issues that have held up nuclear trade between the two countries under a deal reached under President George W. Bush.
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