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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
104729
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| 2 |
ID:
129645
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While China is fast becoming an important outward direct investor, its companies are showing an increasing interest to locate in Europe and the European Union (EU). It has been suggested that this can partly be explained by the more lenient attitude of the European countries compared to the US, where some acquisitions were abandoned when they ran into political opposition based on security concerns. Yet, also in Europe, the media follow rather closely each new Chinese entry, and certain politicians have started to criticise the take-over of technology-oriented companies, especially by Chinese state-owned firms. Against the background of a very open foreign direct investment (FDI) policy as measured by OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index for the EU and the individual countries, an overview is given of the pre- and post-establishment obstacles to direct foreign investment. Also, the EU policy measures that directly or indirectly deal with incoming direct investment are discussed. Within the context of the EU competition policy and the merger regulation, the EU Commission has cleared five cases of take-over by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Although the Lisbon Treaty authorises the EU Commission to take charge of investment policy as part of the EU commercial policy, it will take time to realise this. If the announced negotiations about an investment treaty between China and the EU could work out the necessary balance, it would be an important step in achieving more reciprocity between their respective investment regimes.
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| 3 |
ID:
129646
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rapid increase in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into Europe raises important questions about the implications of such for workers and organized labor in Europe: (1) does Chinese FDI flow more or less to regulated labor markets than do other investment sources?; (2) what are the strategies of works councilors and union representatives in dealing with real or expected investment from China?; and (3) how do individual workers view the propriety of Chinese FDI given China's low-wage, labor-unfriendly profile in the global economy? Quantitative and qualitative data on Chinese FDI, individual opinions about China and globalization, and on strategies of labor representatives provide some leverage to preliminarily answer these questions. First, Chinese FDI does not seem to be more (or less) focused on investing in the least regulated labor markets than other sources of FDI. Second, interviews with works councilors and union representatives in Germany, France and the Netherlands affirm a cautiously optimistic view of Chinese investors as no more or less threatening to organized labor than other investors. Third, analysis of attitudes about Chinese and European interests in managing globalization suggest that less-skilled, more vulnerable, pro-labor-union workers in Europe tend to be more rather than less enthusiastic about Chinese management than their fellow citizens. These patterns suggest a surprising, if tentative, embrace by workers and their representatives in Europe of that investment.
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| 4 |
ID:
129647
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is booming. As China's investment pattern has emerged so far, it appears to have little to do with Chinese firms' preferences for liberal policy regimes, tolerance for corruption, or reliance on communist-era networks. This article documents the current size and shape of Chinese firms' efforts to internationalize in this economic space, demonstrating an important difference between Chinese investment behavior in CEE and in the EU-15, namely the region's much more active use of greenfield activity (and lighter use of M&A and strategic alliances). Case studies of each mode (greenfield, M&A, and strategic alliances) reveal little evidence of a "China, Inc." approach and much evidence that Chinese firms are more motivated by market access than by technology or management assistance.
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