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1 |
ID:
172487
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Summary/Abstract |
Even though the Kim regime has been an exception, the pattern of rapid, unexpected regime collapse among hereditary autocracies indicates a need for policymakers to be prepared.
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2 |
ID:
104767
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
Divergent responses to the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 have raised tensions in Northeast Asia. China's enabling response appeared to write North Korea a blank cheque for further provocations; but Beijing has in fact been constrained by fear of destabilisation of the Kim regime. The incidents have prompted a reappraisal of bilateral relations within the region - in particular, the South Korea-US alliance - and revealed the continuing importance of the Sino-US relationship in Korean peninsular security affairs.
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3 |
ID:
132164
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
When Kim Il Sung, North Korea's founding ruler, died in 1994, many outside observers predicted that his state would die with him. That never happened, of course, and his son Kim Jong Il managed to keep the regime alive until his own death, in 2011. When his son Kim Jong Un took the reins that year, numerous Korea watchers again predicted a collapse. Once again, they were proved wrong. Despite its extreme poverty, North Korea is still very much alive and a major threat to its southern neighbor.
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4 |
ID:
131181
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Recent North Korean internal and foreign policy developments suggest that Kim Jong -un is consolidating his hold on power at home and is now focusing on foreign policy initiatives to enhanced his country's position in future multi party negotiation over its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons programmes, and potentially end its international isolation,
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5 |
ID:
108529
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article argues that North Korean society is designed in a way which makes it
quite immune to pressure and incentives which originate externally. The only
force which in the long run has the capacity to place the North Korean leaders
under sufficient pressure is the North Korean people (and the Cold War experience
demonstrated that such pressure might be decisive). Due to the peculiar situation
of the divided nation and the exceptional success of the South, the North Korean
regime is especially vulnerable to the spread of truthful and uncensored information
about the outside world. So, a low-profile, determined and prolonged information
dissemination campaign is necessary. The North Korean populace should be made
aware of the prosperity of South Korea. The nationalist pretensions of the Kim
regime should be rebuffed. The North Koreans should also be frankly informed
of the less attractive features of the modern world as well. While radio broadcasts
remain the major media for delivering the message, the spread of new digital
technologies creates new opportunities which should be seriously exploited as
well, including video documentaries and electronic books.
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6 |
ID:
130552
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Purpose-To argue that North Korean elites are "true believers" in the Kim personality cult. To present the possibilities for and limitations on using travel to North Korea as a research tool for North Korean scholars.
Design/methodology/approach-I used a tourist trip to North Korea as an opportunity to probe and discuss sensitive subjects with my North Korean guides. I tried to gauge their level of belief in the regime's propaganda.
Findings-It is likely that many North Korean elites are "true believers" in the Kim regime, even though they may entertain doubts about some of its methods.
Practical implications-The underlying stability of North Korea may be stronger than most would suspect or hope.
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