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ID:
193213
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| Summary/Abstract |
The anti-corruption campaign launched by General Secretary Xi Jinping has been one of the most far-reaching bureaucratic overhauls in modern Chinese history. How has Xi's crackdown on corruption shaped bureaucratic selection at the sub-provincial level? In this paper, we find that the purge has influenced how local ties are weighed in the appointment of prefecture city leaders. While it is common for provincial Party chiefs to appoint locally embedded officials to govern localities without high-profile corruption cases, they tend to appoint outside officials without local experience and connections to manage cities whose ex-leaders have recently been prosecuted for corruption. We argue that the provincial leaders’ objective of installing non-local officials is to exert hierarchical control and oversight in localities affected by corruption. Using an original dataset of all Party secretaries from China's 287 prefecture-level cities between 2013 and 2020, we find a significant divergence in the local embeddedness of officials who are appointed to replace corrupt ex-leaders and the embeddedness of those who fill the vacancies of transferred or retired predecessors. Our study sheds light on how Xi's anti-corruption campaign has reshaped the central–local relations and the logic of political control in China.
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| 2 |
ID:
132947
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Reforms carried out by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long followed a traditional model of "experimentation under hierarchy." This article will attempt to develop this model further by building a framework to illustrate the influence of both the political dynamics of hierarchical central-local relations and local economic circumstances in the introduction of large-scale political reforms. The initiation and expansion of "experimental points" are only permitted in those select few provinces with both favourable political and economic local conditions, allowing the CCP to minimize risk and make informed decisions regarding possibilities for nationwide reform. This article proposes that the hierarchical interaction of central and local political elites, and in particular provincial secretaries, can explain the extent of reforms, whereas the type of reform is linked to distinct provincial economic conditions and the provincial secretary's interpretation of provincial priorities. Put succinctly, the CCP's model of political reform can be specifically characterized as "experimentation under hierarchy in local conditions." This article presents a detailed discussion of both the political and economic considerations inherent in this concept, and provides examples of reform programmes in Guangdong and Sichuan to illustrate the model in practice.
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| 3 |
ID:
105223
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Chinese local governments widely resort to extra-budgetary exaction to finance themselves, which generates side effects that necessitate central intervention. Through statistical analysis, this paper finds that the central government intervenes only selectively, following a logic driven by economic development and political stability.
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| 4 |
ID:
105226
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Economic overheating is a significant and recurring problem in modern China. This paper analyzes the many factors causing overheating and argues that there are systemic and largely structural explanations for overheating that arise from a number of theorized catalysts, including a bureaucratic catalyst and a historical catalyst.
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