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| 1 |
ID:
109185
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rome's approach to the Libyan unrest has been guided by two objectives: to protect the commercial relationship that it has built up with Libya over the past decade, and to prevent a mass exodus of migrants toward Italy. Initially, it was believed that these objectives would be endangered by the intervention advocated by Great Britain and France. By early April, principally because Washington's support for the military mission became clearer, the government's policy changed. Italy secured commitments from the rebel leaders to honour existing agreements and to scale future relations to the level of support they receive. Although Rome's concern about immigration proved to be exaggerated, it was also addressed in late April when France agreed to support a proposed reform of Schengen. Once it concluded that the Qadhafi regime was unlikely to survive, Italy cast aside its earlier caution and joined the NATO-led war.
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| 2 |
ID:
144328
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2011, Libya became the only country of the Arab Uprisings where NATO and the Arab League intervened militarily, ostensibly to protect the civilian population, but in reality in support of the opposition National Transitional Council. This article argues that, since 2011, Libya has transitioned from Qadhafi’s centralised authoritarianism to a new decentralised authoritarianism where multiple centres of power coexist and sometimes overlap, while leaving room only for formal democratic institutions. This is the result of decisions taken by the ‘revolutionaries’ after the overthrow of the dictator, and a consequence of long-standing features of the Libyan state and society.
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| 3 |
ID:
105229
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The international community's March 2011 military intervention in Libya contrasts sharply to its reluctance during the preceding forty years to halt the Qadhafi regime's sponsorship of transnational terrorism and pursuit of WMD. American diplomacy, eventually supported by international sanctions, was a four decade effort to end Qadhafi's violent foreign policy. This commentary discusses how diplomacy and the American judicial process combined to achieve this successful outcome. Diplomatic and legislative efforts to compel Libya's payment to terrorism victims helped create judicial remedies enforceable in US Courts and ultimately, a bilateral claims settlement agreement that, while disappointing to the terrorism litigants, normalized relations between the Libya and the United States.
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| 4 |
ID:
111111
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| 5 |
ID:
109752
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| 6 |
ID:
127415
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