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QUINN, JASON MICHAEL (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   150989


Sequencing the peace : how the order of peace agreement implementation can reduce the destabilizing effects of post-accord elections / Joshi, Madhav ; Melander, Erik ; Quinn, Jason Michael   Journal Article
Melander, Erik Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Once a set of civil war actors reach a final peace agreement, a number of different implementation sequences are possible as the negotiated provisions are put into practice. We focus on a key but threatening stepping stone in the post-accord period—the holding of the first post-accord election—which has the capacity to be a stabilizing or destabilizing force. We identify effective accommodation provisions that civil war actors can negotiate and implement before the first post-accord election to reduce the chances of renewed violence. Utilizing new longitudinal data on the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements between 1989 and 2012 and a series of survival models, we find that if the first post-accord election is preceded by the implementation of accommodation measures, elections can have a peace-promoting effect. However, in the absence of preelection accommodation measures, elections are much more likely to be followed by peace failure
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2
ID:   105236


When civil wars recur: conditions for durable peace after civil wars / Mason, T David; Gurses, Mehmet; Brandt, Patrick T; Quinn, Jason Michael   Journal Article
Mason, T David Journal Article
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Publication 2011.
Summary/Abstract We argue that the duration of the peace after civil wars is mainly a function of the extent to which the outcome of the previous civil war preserved a condition of multiple sovereignty and the extent to which the post-civil war environment creates incentives for dissident groups to resort to violence rather than sustain the peace. Hazard models suggest that the outcome of the previous conflict does affect the duration of the peace, and this effect varies across time. The introduction of peacekeeping forces has a substantial positive effect on peace duration. We also find evidence of a curvilinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and post-civil war peace duration. Based on these results, we conclude with recommendations for how peace can be maintained after a civil war.
Key Words Peacekeeping  Peace Failure  Peace Duration  Civil War 
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