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ID:
177993
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| Summary/Abstract |
What should a powerful patron do when a weaker protégé plans to launch a counter-proliferation strike against the nuclear facilities of a target country? This paper identifies three possible strategies available to the patron when handling a ‘trigger happy’ protégé. These strategies range from lending ‘tacit support’ to the protégé’ on the one end, to ‘intervention by exposure’, on the other end, where the raid is effectively sabotaged. Occupying the middle ground is a strategy termed ‘status quo adherence’, in which the patron attempts to warn the protégé against launching the raid, while simultaneously bidding to mitigate the protégé’s concerns by other diplomatic measures. By accessing previously untapped documents from several archives, the study uses the Carter administration’s approach to Israel’s growing agitation with the Iraqi nuclear programme to explore the strategy of ‘status quo adherence’ and its lessons.
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| 2 |
ID:
105240
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Though presidential doctrines claim to be broad, forward-looking articulations of national security principles, they are in fact reactive and narrow. They emerge following crises and can subsequently constrain security policy, creating ideal conditions for new crises to emerge. This paper thus argues that in the pursuit of security, presidential doctrines can perpetuate a cycle of instability. Using the Nixon Doctrine as the present case study reveals that the strategy first came as a response to the failure in Vietnam, then rendered the US unable to foresee or manage the events of 1979: the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These crises subsequently forced a wholesale reassessment of security in the form of the Carter Doctrine. In examining this period of US-Middle East relations, the constricting, reactive nature of doctrines and the concomitant cycles of instability become self-evident.
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| 3 |
ID:
108303
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Jeffrey H. Michaels examines several of the analytical and practical problems of U.S. presidential foreign policy doctrines by looking specifically at the Eisenhower and Carter doctrines. He concludes that presidential doctrines are usually overrated as new statements of principle, and that the elevation of a presidential statement into doctrine can have unintended consequences.
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| 4 |
ID:
187319
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1977, United States president Jimmy Carter wanted a comprehensive peace for the Middle East. Amid the devastating civil war in Lebanon, Israel had found common ground with Christian militias and turned against the Palestinians. However, Carter's peace had to include Israel, and his persistent headache was to get the Jewish state to accept his suggestions, be it in Lebanon or in the negotiations with Egypt. Thus, Carter had to sacrifice any heroic peace for Lebanon on the altar of Egyptian-Israeli peace.
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| 5 |
ID:
002872
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| Publication |
New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 1991.
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| Description |
xvi, 446p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0060183349
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 034385 | 923.5/NOR 034385 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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