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| 1 |
ID:
090219
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In June 2008, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration rocked the food industry-and food lovers-with its warning about tainted tomatoes. Consumers in New Mexico and Texas were contracting a rare, sometimes fatal strain of salmonella and the FDA feared that salmonella contamination from tomatoes was the cause. In the weeks that followed, a major outbreak spread across the country and worried consumers abandoned tomatoes. Fourth of July cookouts were not the same, and BLT lovers complained that their favorite sandwich was impossibly dry. By the end of July, the outbreak had infected more than 1,200 persons in 42 states.
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| 2 |
ID:
093234
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Billions of dollars have been spent in training, mentoring and equipping a new Afghan army which is representative of Afghanistan's diverse ethnic groups and operates in the nation's interests. Yet, at the end of 2009, the Afghan Army is beset by a host of problems including widespread illiteracy, ethnic rivalries, drug use and poor combat effectiveness. Respected Afghan expert Antonio Giustozzi analyses what has gone wrong and suggests that a new model may be the only way forward.
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| 3 |
ID:
103493
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| 4 |
ID:
015870
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| Publication |
1993.
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| Description |
41-50
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| 5 |
ID:
099223
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| 6 |
ID:
103764
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| 7 |
ID:
130870
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In El Narco, journalist Ioan Grillo provides an overview of the history and dynamics of the Mexican drug war. For years, American and Mexican anti-drug authorities believed that the elusive capo of the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquín Guzmán, known as 'El Chapo' or 'Shorty', was hiding out in the remote Sierra Madre. But fresh intelligence, apparently gleaned from Guzmán's captured bodyguards, indicated that he had been making clandestine trips to Culiacán, capital of Sinaloa State, and the Northern Pacific resort of Mazatlán. In the early hours of 22 February 2014, ten pickup trucks carrying Mexican marines pulled up at the Mazatlán condominium where Guzmán was believed to be staying. Breaking down its steel-reinforced door, the soldiers found him in bed with his ex-wife, a former beauty queen. Guzmán may have been visiting Mazatlán for only a day or two to see his twin baby daughters, who were also present, before returning to safer confines in the mountains. Although he did tussle with his captors, Guzmán did not attempt to use the machine gun that rested near his bed. No shots were fired in the raid, despite the fact that agents confiscated 97 rifles and machine guns, 36 handguns, two grenade launchers, a rocket launcher and 43 vehicles, many of which were armoured. Having beaten Guzmán and dragged him outside to confirm his identity, the marines transported their prisoner to Mexico City and, finally, a federal detention centre. Shorty had escaped from the high-security Puente Grande Prison in 2001, allegedly in a laundry van, and had been on the run for 13 years. Now that they had him in their hands once more, the Mexican authorities went out of their way to ensure that he would remain in custody.
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| 8 |
ID:
137978
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| 9 |
ID:
101788
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| 10 |
ID:
106079
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| 11 |
ID:
110998
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| 12 |
ID:
103552
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| 13 |
ID:
129139
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| 14 |
ID:
103549
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| 15 |
ID:
103857
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Obama and Afghanistan" is excerpted from Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the Road to Afghanistan (chapter 10), published in 2010 by Rowman&Littlefield (Lanham, Md.).
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| 16 |
ID:
105155
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The sixth MDG aims 'to combat HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria and other diseases'. The residual category of 'other diseases' has become the focus of intense interest, partly because it has provided an opportunity to increase resources for the control of the mostly parasitic 'neglected tropical diseases' (NTDs). Intense lobbying has secured large amounts of funding from donors, as well as generous donations of medicines from the major drug companies. A massive programme is now underway to treat the parasites of the poor in Africa via integrated vertical interventions of mass drug administration in endemic areas. The approach has been hailed as remarkably effective, with claims that there is now a real prospect of complete control and, for some NTDs, even elimination. However, a closer look at evaluation and research data reveals that much less is known about what is being achieved than is suggested. Competition between implementing organisations is leading to potentially counterproductive exaggerations about treatment coverage. Detailed local-level research in Uganda and Tanzania shows that actual rates of drug take-up among target populations are often lower than is necessary to effectively control the diseases, and that methods of drug distribution may even lead to active resistance to treatment. If current trends are not corrected, declining rates of NTD infection will not be sustained. Much more rigorous and effective monitoring is essential.
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| 17 |
ID:
134402
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| Summary/Abstract |
A defining feature of the ‘9/11 wars’ has been the prominent role played by private military and security companies (pmsc). The growth of this market for military and security services has not gone unnoticed. Yet the role pmsc have played in supporting the US-led war on drugs has largely gone under the radar, both literally and figuratively. The aim of this article is to look at the activities of pmsc funded by the USA in Latin America, and to consider the specific consequences that arise from employing them in the field of counter-narcotics. It is argued that the use of pmsc further entrenches a costly and unsuccessful way of dealing with drugs. There is a need to move from a strict prohibitionist stance and consider alternatives to the war on drugs approach, but the use of pmsc creates another strong vested interest in maintaining an increasingly problematic and costly status quo.
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| 18 |
ID:
097143
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