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| 1 |
ID:
133232
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Attitudes to quangos are paradoxical. On the one hand they are perceived to be undemocratic, unaccountable organisations, while on the other they are seen to improve effectiveness, limit political interference and increase public confidence in government. This paradox is reflected in the behaviour of political parties, which generally adopt a harsh line towards quangos in opposition, but come to rely on these bodies in office. Ahead of the 2010 general election it was, however, noticeable that the Conservative party rejected this dynamic by promising to pursue 'a more sophisticated approach'. This article explores the Coalition government's subsequent 'public bodies reform programme', assessing its progress against recommendations contained within the Institute for Government's Read before Burning report of July 2010. It concludes that while the Coalition has addressed long-standing concerns about the day-to-day governance of public bodies, it has failed to resolve a set of broader and strategic (metagovernance) issues.
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| 2 |
ID:
138220
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| Summary/Abstract |
Several years ago, Russia adopted an economic policy that prioritized modernization and innovation-based development. Despite all the difficulties encountered on the way, the Russian government has persevered in pursuing this policy and even strengthened some of its key aspects, primarily in the military-industrial complex.
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| 3 |
ID:
106548
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| 4 |
ID:
113584
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| 5 |
ID:
105448
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that more emphasis should be placed on the political aspects of international tribunals, which are often in the business of reshaping politics as well as simply administering justice. By examining the hybrid Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), popularly known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, the article develops arguments previously advanced by Victor Peskin in respect of Rwanda and the former Yuogoslavia. Peskin has suggested that courtroom war crimes trials are paralleled by 'virtual trials', in which international and domestic political actors struggle for power and control over the form and outcome of proceedings. He terms these virtual trials 'trials of cooperation', in which governments of states where war crimes have been committed seek variously to help or hinder legal proceedings to address those crimes.
Such virtual trials now loom extremely large in the Cambodian case; the Hun Sen government, while exploiting the ECCC to deflect domestic and international attention from the endemic corruption and growing authoritarianism over which it presides, has sought tightly to limit the Tribunal's room for manoeuvre. One trial has been completed, another is about to start, and the international investigators and prosecutors are planning a couple more-but Prime Minister Hun Sen has personally declared his opposition to any further cases going ahead. If the ECCC succeeds in trying only five defendants from the murderous 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime, justice will not have been done; and wider questions will emerge about the future viability of hybrid tribunals. The Cambodian case demonstrates that where war crimes tribunals are concerned, backroom 'virtual trials' need as much academic, policy and media attention as the actual courtroom trials of key defendants.
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| 6 |
ID:
139788
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite mixed empirical evidence, in the past two decades central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability. Using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure CBI (seventy-eight countries, 1973–2008), we reexamine this relationship, distinguishing the role of printing less money (discipline) from the public's beliefs about the central bank's likely actions (credibility). Democracies differ from dictatorships in the likelihood of political interference and changes to the law because of the presence of political opposition and the freedom to expose government actions. CBI in democracies should be directly reflected in lower money supply growth. Besides being more disciplinarian, it also ensures a more robust money demand by reducing inflation expectations and, therefore, inflation. Empirical results are robust and support a discipline effect conditioned by political institutions, as well as a credibility effect.
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| 7 |
ID:
129335
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| 8 |
ID:
131171
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