Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:4531Hits:25701975Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
MEFFERT, MICHAEL (1) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   105706


Polls, coalition signals and strategic voting: an experimental investigation of perceptions and effect / Meffert, Michael; Gschwend, Thomas   Journal Article
Meffert, Michael Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2011.
Summary/Abstract Polls and coalition signals can help strategic voters in multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition governments to optimise their vote decision. Using a laboratory experiment embedded in two real election campaigns, this study focuses on voters' attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals. The manipulation of polls and coalition signals allows a causal test of their influence on strategic voting in a realistic environment. The findings suggest that active information acquisition to form fairly accurate perceptions of election outcomes can compensate for the advantage of high political sophistication. The theory of strategic voting is supported by the evidence, but only for a small number of voters. Most insincere vote decisions are explained by other factors. Thus, the common practice to consider all insincere voters as strategic is misleading.
Key Words Experiment  Coalitions  Expectations  Strategic Voting  Polls 
        Export Export