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ID:
166300
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| Summary/Abstract |
We investigate the economic impacts of policies for coordinating electricity production in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) through electricity trade. The GCC countries have installed a network of high-voltage transmission lines that links Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The Interconnector has successfully provided reliability services but has not yet realized its full potential as a platform to fully integrate the individual electricity systems.
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| 2 |
ID:
177475
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| Summary/Abstract |
Interconnectors reduce the cost of supplying electricity if they are operated efficiently. We show that established metrics which are used to monitor electricity trading inefficiency are inaccurate for several typical trading conditions. We propose two new metrics—the Unweighted and Price-Weighted Inefficient Interconnector Utilisation indices—to address these deficiencies. These metrics are substantially more accurate than existing ones and perform equally well whether or not interconnected markets have coupled trading. Our analyses show a substantial decrease in inefficient trading between Great Britain (GB) and both France and the Netherlands after the European Union's market coupling regulations were introduced in 2014.
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| 3 |
ID:
105732
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the economic analysis (social cost-benefit analysis) underlying two decisions to build an interconnector (NorNed and the East-West interconnector) in Europe. The main conclusion is that current interconnector and transmission investment decisions in Europe are unlikely to maximize social welfare. The arguments are as follows. (i) It is unclear how much demand for transmission capacity and interconnectors actually exists, and thus the benefits of investment are unclear. (ii) Both analyses underlying the investments studied are incorrect, to the point where, in one case, even the sign may be wrong. (iii) The main criticism concerns the fact that they do not take the resulting changes in generator investment plans into account and ignore the (potential) benefits of increased competition. (iv) Several smaller issues can be improved, such as the discount rate used. (v) Decisions at the European level are taken very differently, and approval may depend on which authority grants approval. (vi) Interconnector decisions receive the most attention, although most money goes to transmission investments. Two research recommendations for future improvements are formulated.
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| 4 |
ID:
119831
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whilst the acquisition of physical transmission interconnector rights between two or more electricity markets can be structured as spread options on the spot prices of electricity between connected markets, empirical evidence suggests that actual prices may be quite different. This raises issues for the valuation of transmission rights, particularly in the European context of market harmonisation, and the use of transmission rights with increasing levels of wind penetration. We examine the price differentials between the Irish and British electricity markets, where explicit transmission capacity auctions have been persistently undersubscribed and transmission rights acquired but not fully utilised. We find significant empirical indications that auction prices for transmission rights are undervalued against both arbitrage and spread option valuations. We also find significant power flows against the efficient price spread direction. A survey of a group of experts with an interest in trading power between Ireland and Britain inform a number of possible explanations for the apparent inefficiencies. These include ex-post pricing in the Irish market, intermittent wind and strategic behaviour by dominant firms.
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| 5 |
ID:
132754
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We study two electricity markets connected by a fixed amount of cross-border capacity. The total amount of capacity is known to all electricity traders and allocated via an auction. The capacity allocated to each bidder in the auction remains private information. We assume that traders are faced with a demand function reflecting the relationship between electricity transmitted between the markets and the spot price difference. Therefore, traders act like Bayesian-Cournot oligopolists in exercising their transmission rights when presented with incomplete information about the competitors' capacities. Our analysis breaks down the welfare effect into three different components: Cournot behavior, capacity constraints, and incomplete information. We find that social welfare increases with the level of information with which traders are endowed.
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