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| 1 |
ID:
166301
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| Summary/Abstract |
Singapore began a huge step to deregulate its electricity market since 2003, with the creation of the National Electricity Market of Singapore (NEMS) allowing for bid-ask offers to be made for the dispatch of electricity supply on the wholesale side. Subsequently, the retail market liberalised in tranches, with 80% of electricity consumers currently already given an option to select their electricity retailers since late 2014. This paper aims to quantitatively analyse how competitiveness in both the wholesale and retail market led to price decreases from 2014 to 2017, using daily data for electricity and oil prices. We find that supply competition and the more recent retail liberalisation efforts has possibly led to a combinatorial decrease in wholesale electricity prices by up to 9.11%, accounting for the influence of oil prices and volatility components. This work seeks also to bring some insights on what to expect from full retail contestability after the latter half of 2018.
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| 2 |
ID:
105752
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nordic residential electricity consumers can now choose among a number of contracts and suppliers. A large number of households have continued to purchase electricity from the incumbent supplier at default contract terms. In this paper, we compare the situation for such passive customers. Danish default prices are regulated whereas default prices in the other countries are unregulated. Systematic price differences exist among the Nordic countries. However, as wholesale prices sometimes differ the gross margin is a more relevant indicator. Regulated gross margins are lower in Denmark than in Sweden but higher than in Norway and Finland. Because of market design Norwegian default contracts are competitive whereas Swedish contracts provide the retailer with some market power. We interpret the low Finnish margins as a result of municipal retailers continuing traditional pricing from the monopoly period. Danish margins are higher than the competitive Norwegian margins but are earned from a much lower level of consumption. The annually margins earned per consumer are very close in the two countries, which indicates that the Danish regulation is achieving its objective of approaching competitive prices.
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| 3 |
ID:
115131
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Residential retail competition in electricity supply was introduced in many countries and some US states as part of electricity industry deregulation. Following problems in the electricity market in California in 2000/2001 many US states, including North Carolina, suspended their deregulation agenda. Recent technological advances have made competition more viable, so we ask if NC should reconsider deregulation and retail competition. The welfare benefits will depend on consumers' willingness to switch suppliers and the potential for value added innovations. In electricity and industries such as pay-tv and telecommunications consumers are 'sticky', remaining with their current supplier even though rivals offer savings. Moreover, some analysts question the likelihood of significant welfare improvements from retail competition. We survey residents in two NC counties focusing on: (i) households' knowledge of and interest in retail competition, (ii) factors that would encourage them to switch suppliers and (iii) the required savings to encourage switching. About 50-65% of respondents would favor retail competition in NC. Demographic variables and experience switching in other industries affect opinions and the savings required to incent switching. We conclude the estimated rate reduction to encourage competitive switching will be hard to achieve in NC as long as rates remain below the national average.
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