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ID:
109690
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the likelihood increases that Russia will dominate the European Union's (EU) energy supply, questions have emerged as to whether Russia would use the energy weapon to influence EU member policies and extract political concessions. Countervailing voices argue that Russia would be restricted by interdependence and market forces. As of yet, no one has analyzed the assumptions underlying the energy weapon thesis. Moreover, many scholars examining EU-Russian energy relations rely on non-Russian data. This article seeks to fill several informational and theoretical gaps by including Russian sources and first-hand data and by systematically analyzing the conditions that must obtain before an energy supplier can successfully convert its energy resources into political power. The resulting model can be utilized to analyze the capacity of a supplier to use the energy weapon-whether it be Russia, Iran, Venezuela or any other energy heavyweight-and to assess whether the deployment was successful. Five purported cases of Russian manipulation are analyzed in this article and the findings indicate that, more often than not, Russia failed to achieve political concessions. Looking to the future, the plausibility of Russia using the energy weapon to exploit Europe's dependence, particularly on gas, is also examined.
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| 2 |
ID:
105756
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Solar power imports to Europe from the deserts of North Africa, as foreseen in the Desertec concept, is one possible way to help decarbonising the European power sector by 2050. However, this approach raises questions of threats to European energy security in such an import scenario, particularly in the light of increasing import dependency and Russia's use of the "energy weapon" in recent years. In this paper we investigate the threat of North African countries using the Desertec electricity exports as an "energy weapon". We develop and use a new model to assess the interdependence - the bargaining power symmetry, operationalised as costs - of a disruption in a future renewable electricity trade between North Africa and Europe. If Europe maintains current capacity buffers, some demand-response capability and does not import much more than what is described in the Desertec scenario, it is susceptible to extortion and political pressure only if all five exporter countries unite in using the energy weapon. Europe is not vulnerable to extortion by an export cut from only one country, as the European capacity buffers are sufficient to restore the power supply: no single exporter country would have sustained bargaining power over Europe.
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| 3 |
ID:
129045
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