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RENOUNCE VIOLENCE (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   106244


Comparison between Intra-German relations and cross-strait rela / Shaocheng, Tang   Journal Article
Shaocheng, Tang Journal Article
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Publication 2010.
Summary/Abstract A comparison of the German and Chinese cases clearly shows their differences and parallels. In Germany, despite confrontation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, they were still able to work out a modus vivendi and interact with each other. This kind of "agree to disagree" compromisemust be based on goodwill on both sides and a favorable international environment. In spite of all the parallels with the German case, Beijing is still concerned about Taiwan separatism, the sustainability of the rule of the Kuomintang, and the possible reaction of the United States to cross-Strait rapprochement. Therefore, "constructive ambiguity" based on the 1992 Consensus has to serve as an interim structure before a peace accord can be signed.
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2
ID:   124852


Is Hamas winning / Byman, Daniel   Journal Article
Byman, Daniel Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract Israel, the United States, and the international community must recognize the ugly truth: Hamas is winning, and it may be too late to reverse this trend. The current drift in policy should be replaced by coercing and incentivizing Hamas to renounce violence. Hamas members are ''ants,'' declared Yasser Arafat, the father and long-/time leader of the Palestinian national movement, during a private speech in 1990. Its cadre, he went on, should cower in their holes lest they be crushed by Arafat's Fatah forces.1 Arafat's swagger seemed justified. Fatah had ruled the roost for decades, and after Hamas emerged in December 1987 as the first intifada erupted, the Islamist organization was on the ropes. After a few unimpressive attacks, Israel had quickly arrested over 1,000 Hamas members, including its top leadership.2 In 1989, less than three percent of Palestinians in Gaza, where Hamas would later prove strongest, supported the organization.3 Journalist Zaki Chehab claimed Hamas' military wing only had twenty machine guns as the intifada wound down.4 Fatah, it seemed, would remain the dominant force in the Palestinian National Movement.
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