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SECOND ARTILLERY CORPS (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   106262


Conventional missions for China's second artillery corps / Christman, Ron   Journal Article
Christman, Ron Journal Article
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Publication 2011.
Summary/Abstract China's traditionally nuclear missile force has added a conventional force component with an inventory of over 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles and an emerging class of theater ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles. This growing conventional missile force provides Beijing an operational-tactical and strategic capability in theater without the political and practical constraints associated with nuclear-armed missiles. China's emerging inventory of conventional antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) affords its military an extra employment option enhancing its layered defense posture against potential offshore threats beyond Taiwan. The military's conventional missiles, operational doctrine, and threat perceptions create conditions for China's escalation to conventional missile attacks against U.S. or allied forces and bases in Asia, including ASBM strikes against U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in any hypothetical China-Taiwan conflict. China's senior leaders would be more likely to authorize such strikes if they endorse the missile force's perceptions of a severe threat to its operations from potential U.S. electronic warfare-based information operations and joint firepower attacks.
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2
ID:   125369


Rise of the PLAAF: implications for India / Sachdev, AK   Journal Article
Sachdev, AK Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract The 'inscrutable' sobriquet for the Chinese is not so much because of their unsmiling faces but on account of their unpredictable actions. Military action against India may not come in the form of a full-fledged war. Small pin pricks in 'disputed territories' may keep increasing in magnitude and frequency until even the submissive and cautious Indian government is constrained to react. Should that happen and a larger military confrontation become inevitable, the PLAAF would be a major instrument of damage to our forces, assets and national pride. Some writings on the 1962 conflict include views that the IAF could have done considerable damage to the Chinese as the PLAAF had outdated aircraft and equipment then. The same is not true about the PLAAF today. The continuing delays in updating capabilities of the IAF relentlessly bring us closer to the possibility of a humiliating experience at the hands of the PLAAF.
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