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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
106357
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 2004 reflects an emerging consensus that more should be done by the international community to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. UNSCR 1540 articulates a universal, legally binding obligation for all states to confront proliferation by adopting effective export control systems. To date, however, there have been no attempts to systematically analyze compliance with this new obligation, making it impossible to assess the success of this measure and the underlying causes of any shortcomings. This study addresses this by conducting a systematic empirical analysis of state compliance with UNSCR 1540. Drawing upon theories of compliance with international law, we investigate two distinct explanations for variation in the degree to which states adopt nonproliferation export controls: one based on state interests and enforcement and the other based on state capacity. Our statistical tests of these theories use a new, cross-national data set detailing the nonproliferation policies of 30 states. The empirical results indicate that compliance with international nonproliferation obligations is influenced most by a state's economic and governmental capacities and has little to do with interest-based factors. These findings suggest that capacity-building programs are the best option for improving the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and of nonproliferation efforts in general.
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| 2 |
ID:
160533
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much of international cooperation research has long assumed that building and deepening (i.e. institutionalizing) international agreements can substitute for weak domestic bureaucratic capacity when it comes to promoting cooperative policies between countries. Qualifying this assumption, we argue that domestic bureaucracies are a key piece of international cooperation: the cooperation-inducing effect of international institutions is conditional on the quality of domestic bureaucracies. We examine this relationship in the context of the politics of interstate cooperation over transboundary rivers, an important test case given concerns about looming water conflict in the face of increasing water scarcity. Using data on freshwater-related events, 1984–2006, on the level of institutionalization of river treaties, and on the quality of domestic bureaucracy, we find that domestic bureaucracies moderate the ability of international institutions to elicit cooperative interstate behavior. The finding is robust to a multitude of specifications and provides important implications for institutional research and policy approaches to cooperation problems beyond freshwater.
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| 3 |
ID:
189017
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| Summary/Abstract |
Comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are the most impactful negotiated settlements ending civil wars, but their implementation varies across post-conflict countries and over time. To explain varying implementation, this study identifies central challenges in CPA implementation and suggests that international third parties are uniquely positioned to overcome them. (1) IGOs with high economic leverage, and (2) prior foreign aid both set incentives that reduce domestic barriers to implementation. Quantitative evidence on the implementation of CPAs from 1989-2015 supports this argument. Both post-conflict countries’ participation in IGOs with high economic leverage and higher volumes of prior foreign aid are associated with higher rates of CPA implementation. Multiple estimation approaches, including instrumental variables, support this finding. Case evidence from the 2007 CPA in Ivory Coast tracks the processes by which IGOs and donors help overcome stakeholder resistance and facilitate implementation. This finding encourages more concerted efforts by policymakers to advance CPA implementation.
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| 4 |
ID:
184200
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do some democracies revert to non-democratic forms of governance? We develop an explanation of democratic reversals that emphasizes the influence of states’ external border relations on domestic politics. Latent threats to a state’s territory encourage political centralization of authority in the executive to defend against danger to the homeland. Latent territorial threat also facilitates the construction and maintenance of large land armies to fight threatening neighbors. Combined, latent territorial threat increases leaders’ domestic power, weakens democratic institutions, encourages other conditions threatening democratic survival, and, ultimately, leads to democratic reversals. Synthesizing prior research on territorial conflict, we generate a quantitative, continuous measure of latent territorial threat against all democracies with contiguous neighbors from 1946 to 2016, using Bayesian estimation. Empirical tests accounting for measurement uncertainty and other common determinants of reversals as well as brief reviews of individual cases of reversal provide robust evidence that democracy failed at higher rates in countries facing high levels of threats to their territory from neighbors. Our study implies that a complete account of the development of democratic institutions should emphasize that domestic factors alone fall short of explaining why democracies fail.
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