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ID:
121225
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Canada proved to be a reliable and cooperative partner of the Americans
on a variety of air defence initiatives in the early Cold War. Both countries
constructed a dense network of radar lines, prioritized their respective air
defence forces, and eventually agreed to a binational North American Air
Defence Command (NORAD), imbued with the operational control of both
countries' air defence forces. However, Canada's role in strategic defence
was just as quickly challenged by the development of intercontinental
ballistic missiles. NORAD's raison d'être shifted to the early warning and
tracking of these long-range delivery systems, even as Washington became
increasingly infatuated with the potential of missile defences from the late
1960s onward. Importantly, Canada consistently refrained from cooperating
with the United States on strategic missile defence.
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| 2 |
ID:
138286
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arctic is perceived as an area that requires increased North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) attention. On the one hand, the region has always been of particular concern to NORAD, especially during the Cold War. From this perspective, attention to the Arctic is business as usual. On the other hand, increased potential traffic in the region due to warmer temperatures, natural resource exploitation, and tourism could increase threats to North America and create the need for a new NORAD posture. This paper reviews the challenges facing the Arctic, the perceived new urgency for attention, the command and control structures of NORAD, and NORAD’s specific preoccupations in order to answer the question: does the Arctic represent status quo for NORAD or does NORAD need to change, fundamentally, its approach to the North? This paper ultimately argues for the former.
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| 3 |
ID:
106521
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| 4 |
ID:
138285
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| Summary/Abstract |
Concerns about the future of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) have forever dominated Canadian policy considerations regarding participation in the US missile defence program. Yet, fears that a Canadian decision not to participate could lead to the ‘‘demise’’ or marginalization of NORAD appear entirely unfounded in the wake of the formal Canadian refusal in 2005. This article identifies the reasons behind these fears relative to the nature and future of NORAD, and explains why they are both understandable and misplaced. Since the United States neither has, nor has ever had, a significant system requirement for Canadian participation, Washington has separated missile defence from the NORAD question. While this change in approach and legitimate concerns about NORAD’s marginalization have been managed through a Canadian military space contribution, it is likely that missile defence and military space cooperation will be managed on a bilateral basis largely outside of, and in support of, existing NORAD missions. This process reflects the reality of Canada–US North American defence cooperation, and NORAD’s limited place within it.
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| 5 |
ID:
138284
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the current Canadian discussion of missile defence, it is often claimed that the future of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is under threat and that it will be saved only if Canada opts in. The command does not need saving, however. Any such claim draws attention away from the real North American defence challenges that Canadians need to face in a debate about continental strategic defence: whether or not Canada needs to be protected by a missile defence system (a point that a Senate committee strongly emphasized in 2014) and what Ottawa needs to do about its own air defences that fall under NORAD.
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| 6 |
ID:
117108
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| 7 |
ID:
138293
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article reviews Joseph Jockel’s classic study of bilateral Canadian–American defence arrangements during the early Cold War: No Boundaries Upstairs. It considers the political context in which Jockel wrote and highlights the bilateral experiences that contributed to his unique perspective. It also reviews Jockel’s account and analysis of the evolution of Canadian–American continental defence cooperation from 1945 to 1958. Finally, this article describes the longevity of Jockel’s analysis as well as how historians and political scientists continue to build on his research.
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