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| 1 |
ID:
106645
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Budget support-aid delivered directly to developing country government budgets-accounts for a growing proportion of overseas development assistance. In theory it has multiple benefits over other forms of aid in terms of attaining poverty reduction and development objectives. However, recent years have seen several incidents of budget support being frozen, halted or redirected because of slippage in the democratic credentials of certain countries, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Nicaragua, Honduras, Madagascar and Rwanda. This article analyses these incidents in relation to debates over aid conditionality. It finds that donors are willing to apply political conditionality when otherwise good performing governments go politically astray, but it questions whether budget support is a viable instrument for pushing for democratic change. Co-ordinated donor action appears to be increasing, but aid flows to the countries discussed remain high and the governments in question tend to be dismissive in the face of such pressure.
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| 2 |
ID:
131373
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The complex relationship between democracy and development has been extensively discussed in academic literature. However, we do not have much knowledge of how this translates into donor practices. How does the European Commission (EC) deal with tensions arising from promoting democracy and development? To answer this question, this article operationalises the distinction between 'democracy promoters' and 'developmental donors', focusing specifically on budget support and governance incentive tranches. Empirically we examine the implementation of the EC's budget support and Governance Incentive Tranche in Ethiopia (2005-10), a case where the dilemma between democracy promotion and development cooperation is particularly strong. Investigating the position of the EC along the democracy promoter versus developmental donor continuum, we conclude that the EC's position lies between these extremes. However, in the case of budget support, a shift has been made away from the Commission being a democracy promoter and towards the role of developmental donor.
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| 3 |
ID:
113354
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Budget Support (bs) has been considered the aid modality that best realises the Paris Declaration principles of alignment, harmonisation and respect for recipient ownership. In design the modality has a very strong technocratic focus, and the oecd/dac has endorsed the idea that bs should be delinked from broader political concerns. In reality, however, donors do use bs to leverage more and better democratic governance. This political use of bs is not limited to exceptional moments when the political situation seriously deteriorates in certain countries. This article shows that such use is grounded in fundamentally different visions and policies that donors hold regarding the scope of leverage for bs. Such starkly diverging interpretations of which reforms bs can 'buy' undermine the objectives the modality was designed to achieve.
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