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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
106587
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This review article explores the emotional attractions of war and military combat. Using Sebastian Junger's recently published book War as a central point of reference, it elucidates and supports the idea that, for combatants, war is often experienced as a profoundly exciting and existentially rewarding human activity. By bringing into focus and helping to conceptualize the raw appeal of combat, Junger's account of war can be enlisted as a resource for understanding the positive emotional drives behind acts of terrorism.
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| 2 |
ID:
106584
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Families might be an important source of norms that legitimize terrorism, an assumption that has yet to be tested empirically. To investigate this, surveys were administered to 20 immediate relatives of 16 Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) members in Indonesia. Family members were found to agree with their kin's involvement in the violent activities of JI, and perceived their community as being supportive. Agreement with their relative's involvement in JI was predicted by anti-Western sentiment, not support for violent jihad. Kinship to a suicide bomber predicted less support for their family member's involvement in JI. Implications for deradicalization strategies are discussed.
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| 3 |
ID:
106580
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While experts understand that Al Qaeda's attack patterns and operational qualities are changing, they struggle to identify and generate consensus on Al Qaeda's strategic center of gravity. By defining different levels of Al Qaeda, core, periphery, and movement, this article engages current debates about the threat by focusing on the operational differences across these three levels. Contrary to conventional wisdom about operational efficiency, the social movement has a higher success rate but the core imposes greater costs as measured by casualties. The cells or networks actually executing the attacks also display substantive differences. The social movement networks organize in smaller cells than either affiliated groups or the core; however, they display greater levels of connectedness. The affiliated and organization cells display fewer connections, suggestive of more disciplined operational procedure despite lower success rates. These patterns reflect fundamental differences across characterizations of Al Qaeda, and have significant implications for counterterrorism efforts.
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| 4 |
ID:
106586
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While a consensus has emerged concerning the role radicalization plays in persuading Westerners to participate in terrorism, little research investigates the cognitive processes inherent to radicalization processes. Transformative learning theory, developed from the sciences in education and rehabilitation, offers an interdisciplinary lens with which to study the processes of personal change associated with radicalization. Transformative radicalization explains how triggering factors lead to critical reflection of meaning perspectives and personal belief systems that guide and alter behavior. Using an autobiographical account of the radicalization process, this study offers a plausibility probe of an inherently interdisciplinary and novel theoretical framework.
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| 5 |
ID:
106582
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations in Afghanistan as a way to get at the strategic disconnects in ends, ways, and means that the author believes are endemic to large-scale protracted stability and COIN (counterinsurgency) operations against adversaries who do not pose palpable existential threats to the members of an alliance. The article focuses mainly on the period that followed President Barack Obama's December 2009 announcement of a civilian and military "surge" in Afghanistan through the early stages of the ISAF offensive in Marjah, which began in February 2010. The article concludes that the fundamental strategic issue is that the Allies are not willing (or able) to devote enough resources to achieve their stated objectives. No matter how much the "Ways" might be improved, the "Means" are not sufficient to attain the "Ends." Thus, what is needed is a more realistic understanding of what ISAF can accomplish in Afghanistan and what NATO might be expected to accomplish in future operations.
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