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1 |
ID:
050113
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Publication |
Jan-March 2004.
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2 |
ID:
170536
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3 |
ID:
170990
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Summary/Abstract |
ABSTRACT
In the mid-1950s, Jawaharlal Nehru advanced an alternative approach to regional security, pursuing it enthusiastically. He held that employing diplomacy in accord with the ‘Five Principles’ of peaceful coexistence, regional governments could establish ‘areas of peace’ and achieve ‘collective peace’. China played an essential role in this process, becoming the lynchpin of Nehru’s regional strategy. Although mindful of China’s potentially subversive role in Asia, Nehru downplayed such misgivings, urging Beijing’s commitment to the Principles. By doing so, he endeavoured to ‘create an environment’ where China would find it increasingly difficult ‘to break away from the pledges given’. Furthermore, by supporting China’s participation to the 1955 Bandung Conference, he wished to end Beijing’s isolation and transform India’s giant neighbour into a stabilising regional force. This analysis revisits Nehru’s policy of peaceful coexistence, making a fresh contribution to the study of Cold War India’s external relations. In addition, it explains how such a policy, crucially centred on Sino-Indian rapprochement, took shape and appeared, at least briefly, to make progress and deliver on Nehru’s expectations
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4 |
ID:
056765
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5 |
ID:
052812
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6 |
ID:
152160
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Summary/Abstract |
The border disputes of India with China and Pakistan are a parting gift of the British to the subcontinent. It is about inaccessible land that the British had acquired on India’s Northern, Western and Eastern borders to protect British India from the perceived threat of a Russian invasion, as these lands could act as buffer areas. Much of it was settled on paper with no land demarcation done on ground, so much so when a road was built by the Chinese in Aksai Chin area, Government of India came to know of it only when the Chinese announced the inauguration of the road. Likewise unmarked borders with Kashmir have resulted in decades of unrest in the region.
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7 |
ID:
050109
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Publication |
Jan-March 2004.
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8 |
ID:
016154
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Publication |
Winter 1993.
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Description |
69-87
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9 |
ID:
069661
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10 |
ID:
170767
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Summary/Abstract |
Given the divergent national interests and complex outstanding issues between India and China, ‘one on one’ informal summits format adopted by PM Modi and President Xi has definitely contributed towards keeping the bilateral relations on track. The first such summit was held at Wuhan in China on 27-28 April 2018. Its key outcome was putting in place a process of bilateralism to facilitate strategic communication at the highest level and building mutual trust – ‘wuhan Spirit’. The summit also sought to provide ‘strategic guidance’ to the respective militaries to enhance cooperation for effective border management.
The second summit was held on 11-12 October 2019 at Mamallapuram, with focus on restoration of ‘Wuhan Spirit’, revamping the process of strategic communication and lending impetus to the mechanism of strategic guidance. President Xi laid down ‘100 year plan’ to rejuvenate the relations between two neighbours, signifying incremental approach to narrow the existing divide. He made six specific proposals seeking both sides to correctly view each other’s development and enhance mutual trust.
Relations between Delhi and Beijing transcend bilateral bounds and have strategic significance with far reaching ramifications. Real challenge for the two is to keep contentious issues at bay and yet, enlarge the area of cooperation. Informal dialogue between the top leaders offers an excellent platform to this end. While reimagining ‘new era of cooperation’, India must be forth right in safeguarding its national objectives as Chinese are ardent practitioners of realpolitik.
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11 |
ID:
147981
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Summary/Abstract |
As India China turn their gaze seaward in search of prosperity and energy security, both have embarked on a naval build up unprecedented in the nation’s modern history. Both countries in earlier centuries participated in mercantile trade and had their association with Southeast and South Asian nations. Indian leadership and strategic experts have been trying to revive the grand old strategy of ‘Indian Ocean being regarded as British lake/Indian lake’, therefore commanding the entire region as maritime power. China’s contemporary leadership also sees their rise as economic, military, and naval power as merely the latest phase in a benign regional dominance that had its origins in the Ming era. India and China, both today are busy in their naval build-up and fierce diplomatic manoeuvres and are trying to prevail upon their neighbours/coastal nations not to align with external powers to balance them.
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12 |
ID:
156570
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Summary/Abstract |
One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative of China is one of most ambitious foreign and economic policy in recent times which parallels that of the Marshal Plan of post-world war world order. It is the pet project of President Xi Jinping and aims to strengthen Beijing’s economic leadership through a vast program of infrastructure building throughout China’s neighbouring regions.
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13 |
ID:
051578
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Publication |
Jan-Mar 2004.
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14 |
ID:
141375
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15 |
ID:
056300
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16 |
ID:
056634
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17 |
ID:
179261
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Summary/Abstract |
Internal party rifts in the Nepali government preoccupied leaders, who squandered opportunities to prepare a coherent response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic resulted in a four-month lockdown, with widespread economic and social consequences. The government’s response to criticism was to propose legislation restricting citizens’ rights, prompting accusations of creeping authoritarianism. Continued tensions along Nepal’s borders led to escalated rhetoric. The crises of 2020 exacerbated existing problems with governance, social inequality, and poverty.
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18 |
ID:
056764
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19 |
ID:
053640
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20 |
ID:
057412
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