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| 1 |
ID:
189676
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| Summary/Abstract |
During 19 of the last 26 years in Australia, the conservative Liberal Party has been at the forefront of defining and cultivating the country’s foreign policy and its broader approaches toward global security. Not surprisingly, that has included maintaining a nonintrusive line in the arms control and nuclear nonproliferation domain.
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| 2 |
ID:
172573
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the imprecise boundary between Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and Human-Machine Teaming – as a subset of Human-Machine Interaction – and the extent both are emerging as a point of concern (and option) in military and security policy debates. As the development of Human-Machine Teaming relates to artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities there also exists an area of concern pertaining to reliability and confidence, particularly in the heat of battle. Also known as Manned-Unmanned Teaming, Human-Machine Teaming attempts to engender trust and collaborative partnerships with robots and algorithms. Clearly the prospect of LAWS in recent times, or so-called ‘killer robots,’ has raised questions relating to the degree such devices can be trusted to select and engage targets without further human intervention. Aside from examining the ‘trust factor,’ the article also considers security threats posed by both state and non-state actors and the complicit yet inadvertent role multinational corporations play in such developments where civilian technology is modified for dual-purposes. The effectiveness of government regulation over AI, including whether AI can be ‘nationalised’ for national security reasons, will also be examined as part of AI non-proliferation.
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| 3 |
ID:
158518
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the twenty-first century appears to be entering a more intensified globalised nuclear age, nations and academics alike consistently criticise the frameworks and foundational agencies created to ensure non-proliferation, security, and multi-lateral negotiations. Notwithstanding the significant reductions in nuclear arsenals made over the last several decades, thanks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the numerous nuclear agencies and watchdogs, it is evident that the risks emanating from nuclear weapons and their associated materials have continually expanded. By ensuring that the global community has protections and safeguards in place to promote international dialogue and nuclear non-proliferation—including the Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Program, International Atomic Energy Agency, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, as well as nuclear free zones and review processes—the nuclear non-proliferation regime can arguably ensure that the devastating threat to humankind is reduced. However, as countries scramble to once again refine and modernise their nuclear stockpiles, the necessity to review, re-shape, and re-think these foundational safeguards is more vital than ever.
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| 4 |
ID:
106774
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Contrasting the nuclear guidance documents and public statements of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations reveals significant differences in American nuclear policy, but also surprising continuities. Bush's aim was never disarmament, but rather extending the life and potential role of American nuclear weaponry. An evaluation of the guidance documents that developed this approach, and major development programmes like the Reliable Replacement Warhead, shows that the Bush strategy was an attempted quiet revolution that foreshadowed a new nuclear era in which the former 'weapon of last resort' became a usable and necessary war-fighting device.
In contrast, Barack Obama promised significant changes in American nuclear policy. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, Obama offered a vision of a transformed international security context and the goal of total nuclear disarmament. Although he made eventual nuclear disarmament the central goal of American nuclear weapons policy, Obama stopped short of change on critical issues that have lingered since the Cold War. A moderate NPR and New START Treaty, together with pragmatic developments at the Nuclear Security Summit and the 2010 NPT Review Conference, as well as on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, indicate that the role of nuclear weapons in American security policy has changed less than is widely assumed. Obama has pursued a policy of nuclear balance, with incremental steps toward disarmament accompanied by measures to retain American primacy and nuclear options.
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| 5 |
ID:
166075
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| Summary/Abstract |
Australia has often championed itself as a good global citizen and middle power committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. For years, its top leaders have consistently advocated for irreversible reductions to nuclear arsenals of all nuclear-armed states. They have also regularly emphasized Australia’s commitment to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of global peace and security and to pursuing practical, realistic measures for nuclear disarmament.
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