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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
193080
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article begins by outlining four post-WWII strategies of right-wing revolutionary resistance: vanguardism; the cell system; leaderless resistance; and metapolitics. Next, the article argues that metapolitics became a preferred strategy for many right-wing revolutionaries during the 2000s and early 2010s, and proposes three conditions that may help explain this metapolitical turn: limited opportunities for armed resistance; a subcultural style shift; and new opportunities for promoting alternative worldviews online. Finally, the article theorizes about the types of threats that may emerge in the wake of this metapolitical turn, and speculates about the likelihood of a new and more violent turn in the near future.
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| 2 |
ID:
163199
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| Summary/Abstract |
Combining new quantitative and qualitative data, this article first describes and compares the evolution of right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic countries between 1990 and 2015. Having established that Sweden has experienced considerably more right-wing terrorism and militancy than the other Nordic countries have, the article then seeks to account for Sweden’s outlier position. In doing so, the article draws on three concepts proposed by social movement research: organizational resources, political opportunities, and frame analysis. Applying these concepts to the Nordic countries, the study finds that Sweden’s outlier position may result from different WWII experiences, leaving Sweden with a stronger and more resilient extreme right movement, but also from receiving more immigrants while lacking influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and from conducting a more restrictive public debate on immigration, leaving little room for anti-immigration concerns in the public sphere. While the first two explanations are consistent with existing research, the third challenges the dominant view on how the public debate on immigration might influence extreme right mobilization and violence.
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| 3 |
ID:
106781
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Comprehensive intelligence support has become a key requirement in contemporary peace operations. To deal with complex security challenges, international organizations are required not only to develop relevant intelligence structures but also to integrate civilian and military information and actors within them. There is an inherent risk, however, that too much integration will water down intelligence as a concept, in so far as it becomes more difficult to protect sensitive information, sources and methods. Both the UN and the EU have sought to establish integrated intelligence structures, but with mixed results. In tracing the evolution of UN and EU intelligence, this article sheds light on the trend in international peacekeeping towards intelligence-driven operations. In bringing together new empirical knowledge about the two organizations, the article also identifies key determining factors behind the development of intelligence structures within international organizations - a capacity normally seen as belonging to the national domain.
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| 4 |
ID:
190971
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| Summary/Abstract |
Between 2009 and 2015, both Islamist and anti-Islamist protest groups were active in Britain and Norway. However, while these opposing groups regularly clashed violently in the U.K., such interactions never occurred in Norway. This paper seeks to explain why seemingly similar group dyads produced different outcomes in different cases. In doing so, we trace relevant causal mechanisms derived from social movement theory in a comparative case study design. The paper can also be read as a response to Busher and Macklin’s call for improving conceptual clarity in research on “cumulative extremism.” Part of our response is introducing an alternative concept: Reciprocal intergroup radicalisation (RIR). Our analysis further shows that in Britain, RIR was fuelled by the presence of militant activists on both sides, a competent leadership, a central enemy image of the adversary, and a perception of unjust repression by security authorities. Conversely, the absence of these factors contained RIR between the Norwegian groups. In conclusion, our paper cautions against exaggerating the threat from RIR as multiple conditions must combine for RIR to occur. Even in Britain, by many considered a hotbed for RIR, the combined presence of these conditions was short lived.
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