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| 1 |
ID:
179278
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, hybrid warfare has become a widely used yet ambiguous term to describe Russia's hostile activities. In academic publications and policy documents, there have been a plethora of different definitions and concepts to make sense of hybrid warfare. This article takes a bottom-up approach and analyzes the discourse of political and military representatives in the United Kingdom to explore how they understand hybrid warfare by Russia and what the implications are for defense policy. Using qualitative content analysis with quantitative aspects, the results show not only a range of different terms used to describe Russia's hostile activities, but also that the discussed topics do not reflect one particular definition of hybrid warfare. The analysis further reveals that representatives highlight non-military aspects of hybrid warfare over the military ones and consider the role of defense policy dependent on the nature of a particular hybrid threat.
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| 2 |
ID:
106806
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| 3 |
ID:
152676
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| 4 |
ID:
160806
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| Summary/Abstract |
Today Russia poses significant challenges that require sophisticated responses from both Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), yet more research is needed on almost all aspects of policy development. Academic experts on NATO and Russia could contribute significantly to this process. To this end, collaboration and engagement among those experts with each other’s literature would be highly beneficial. Appropriate methodologies must be developed to answer questions about Russia’s specific intentions, test the assumptions upon which NATO and Canada’s policies are founded, and discover and respond to the root causes of Russia’s discontent. Policy options should be based on detailed knowledge of global security dynamics, as well as high-quality analysis about Russia’s rhetoric and its varied use of hard, soft, and sharp soft power in regional and global cases. A research network on these topics could help decision-makers respond to these complex developments by approaching them through “the eyes of our adversaries,” clarifying the big picture of hybrid warfare and also the micro-level details.
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| 5 |
ID:
144335
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of the Cold War, a huge debate over how war has been changing has emerged; a common feature is that modern conflicts are not state vs. state wars, but ‘irregular wars’. In order to better understand modern irregular warfare, it is important to analyse past authors and ideas. Carlo Bianco’s concept of Guerra per bande highlights elements of mobility with different cooperating units, of terror, and of complex terrain. The present study offers the first English analysis of Carlo Bianco and underlines the similarities of his work to the hybrid warfare concept.
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| 6 |
ID:
173344
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2020.
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| Description |
xx, 183p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788194465980
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059896 | 355.42/BAS 059896 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
167800
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| Summary/Abstract |
The nature and means of conducting warfare have always been changing. Technology, political realities and ideologies continue to play crucial role in this transformation as witnessed in the two world wars, the Cold War, and in following decades. Non-state actors became more visible and important. Nowadays, many wars involve such actors against state parties, for example, the US global war on terror, Israel-Hezbollah War (2006) and the current war against the Islamic State (ISIL). The term hybrid war involves a combination of traditional and nonconventional means, has become a common subject of discussion. But hybrid war is nothing new and has been practiced since ancient times. Several countries have now resorted to hybrid war: one such country is Russia, who has been blamed by western countries in this regard, e.g., in Georgian War (2008), Crimea (2014), ongoing conflict in eastern and south Ukraine, disinformation campaign against the West and interference in their governance process. Russia similarly, blames them for its destabilization by increased military presence on its borders and inciting revolutions in neighbour countries. Meanwhile, countries are developing hybrid warfare capacities, including plans for deploying military robots. Non-state actors now also use hybrid means like the Hezbollah or ISIL and several ongoing wars are becoming growingly hybrid; besides, the clash of ideologies, i.e., religious radicalism vs. white supremacism can create conflicts, indicating future wars may be even more so. Yet, some old mechanisms and strategies are likely to remain relevant and useful in future wars as well, suggesting their true ever-evolving and hybrid character.
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| 8 |
ID:
188466
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE TERM "warfare" has increasingly blurred boundaries in the 21st century, with countries coming up with new forms of conflicts against adversary states. This has led to the emergence of new terms such as "postmodern wars" [16], "mutiny wars" [4], and "network-centric warfare" [2]. The best-known of these new terms is "hybrid warfare," which came into being between the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is believed to have emerged in the US. Frank G. Hoffman was one of the first to write about changes to methods of warfare and to give a definition of hybrid warfare: "Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.... These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict" [19, p. 8]. Characteristics of a hybrid conflict arguably include
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| 9 |
ID:
175720
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| Summary/Abstract |
Can rebels utilize variation in modes of warfare to overcome long odds and defeat incumbent forces? I find that rebel use of hybrid forms of warfare – the alternating use of conventional and irregular warfare – produce remarkably higher rates of victory over rebellions utilizing only irregular or conventional warfare. I argue that specific structural and organizational conditions enable use of hybrid warfare. Access to sanctuary, centralized command, and social-political cohesion interact with one another to create remarkably flexible and durable rebel organizations capable of absorbing conventional defeats, while using irregular warfare to shape conditions for eventual conventional victory.
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| 10 |
ID:
178557
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| Summary/Abstract |
Hybrid warfare has been a popular term that refers to contemporary warfare. Despite the increasing number of critiques, NATO has used the term in its strategic documents and summit declarations. Since concepts are important in shaping our understanding and the way that our forces fight, NATO’s use of a controversial concept has raised some questions. In this context, this paper aims to explore the meaning of the hybrid warfare from the viewpoint of NATO, based on in-depth interviews with NATO officials who have sufficient expertise and experience about the concept. The authors conclude that hybrid warfare is an ambiguous concept which clouds NATO’s strategic thinking and leads NATO to forget the difference between war and peace. Further analysis has revealed that NATO uses this concept as a tool for the strategic communication rather than a military concept.
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| 11 |
ID:
157603
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In this policy brief, after an account of the historical-political context of Russia’s recent aggressive actions, I examine the objectives, strategy, and tactics of Russia’s information warfare, particularly as concerns eastern Europe and Syria, although also against selected western European states and the USA. Of special interest is the notion that Russia’s disinformation is potent because it does not necessarily establish falsehoods as true, but rather pollutes political discourse such that news information consumers are led to doubt the very concepts of truth and objective political facts. I conclude by (a) discussing the impact this strategy has had—and will continue to have—on Europe’s domestic politics, as well as on the global liberal order, and then (b) broaching policy ideas for countering Russian disinformation.
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| 12 |
ID:
186205
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| Summary/Abstract |
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates once again that hybrid threats are increasingly challenging European countries. Although there is international cooperation on the conceptual level, individual countries are responsible for the actual implementation of counter hybrid measures. This article compares the approaches of Finland, Germany and the Netherlands to counter hybrid threats, while taking into consideration their strategic culture. It shows that the countries differ in their approach to counter hybrid threats in terms of their organisation of security and the scope of measures taken to deter adversaries. These differences are mainly rooted in historical, institutional and political processes. The countries are rather similar in detecting hybrid threats and responding to hybrid attacks, which can be explained by the nature of hybrid threats. Consequently, strategic culture is a context that shapes but not ultimately determines how Finland, Germany and the Netherlands counter hybrid threats. The results of this article suggest that our current understanding of strategic culture is insufficient to describe and explain an actor’s security policy in the contemporary security environment. It is recommended that the concept of strategic culture should be revised and has to be examined more broadly by including national security issues and a broad spectrum of instruments of power.
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| 13 |
ID:
160620
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| Summary/Abstract |
What are the ethical pitfalls of countering hybrid warfare? This article proposes an ontological security-inspired reading of the EU and NATO’s engagement with hybrid threats. It illustrates how hybrid threat management collapses their daily security struggles into ontological security management exercise. This has major consequences for defining the threshold of an Article 5 attack and the related response for NATO, and the maintenance of a particular symbolic order and identity narrative for the EU. The institutionalisation of hybrid threat counteraction emerges as a routinisation strategy to cope with the “known unknowns”. Fostering resilience points at the problematic prospect of compromising the fuzzy distinction between politics and war: the logic of hybrid conflicts presumes that all politics could be reduced to a potential build-up phase for a full-blown confrontation. Efficient hybrid threat management faces the central paradox of militant democracy whereby the very attempt to defend democracy might harm it.
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| 14 |
ID:
151875
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| 15 |
ID:
165133
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cyberspace is a new domain of operation, with its own characteristics. Cyber weapons differ qualitatively from kinetic ones: They generate effects by non-kinetic means through information, technology, and networks. Their properties, opportunities, and constraints are comparable to the qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. New weapons and their target sets in a new domain raise a series of unresolved policy challenges at the domestic, bilateral, and international levels about deterrence, attribution, and response. They also introduce new risks: uncertainty about unintended consequences, expectations of efficacy, and uncertainty about both the target’s and the international community’s response. Cyber operations offer considerable benefits for states to achieve strategic objectives both covertly and overtly. However, without a strategic framework to contain and possibly deter their use, make state and non-state behavior more predictable in the absence of reciprocal norms, and limit their impact, an environment where states face persistent attacks that nonetheless fall below the threshold of armed conflict presents a policy dilemma that reinforces collective insecurity.
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| 16 |
ID:
156555
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| Summary/Abstract |
The term “hybrid warfare” is a new one that the West began to use to explain its failure to cope with asymmetric threats. Focusing on the war on global terrorism, the West temporarily withdrew its attention from traditional adversaries, such as Russia, which has used this gap and has audaciously returned to the stage as a global actor. Until the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and inflaming the Ukrainian crisis, most Western authors attributed “hybrid threats” mostly to non-state actors. But the Ukrainian scenario showed the true face of “hybridity” in the modern battlefield when practised by a powerful state actor. Russian “hybrid warfare” in Ukraine has already been seen as a combination of conventional and unconventional methods, that have been complemented with other instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic and information. The purpose of this article is, through an analysis of the Ukrainian scenario, to demonstrate that although the term “hybrid” is new, the concept itself is old and is a continuation of already seen doctrine from the Cold War era. Although “hybrid threats” can come both from state and non-state actors, the Russian interference in Ukraine is proof that they are especially dangerous for the West if, or when, they are initiated from a traditional, sophisticated adversary that has the capacity to use all forms of warfare.
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| 17 |
ID:
183999
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper conducts a comparative analysis of the role and significance of deterrence and coercion as elements of the hybrid warfare strategy against Russia. It proposes certain measures for countering such threats.
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| 18 |
ID:
152831
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| Summary/Abstract |
The authors analyze changes in the essence and content of the concepts of war and armed struggle in the context of 21st century globalization.
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| 19 |
ID:
118505
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| 20 |
ID:
192654
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| Summary/Abstract |
A gray zone conflict that emerged after the Russian annexation of Crimea was an element of the Russian strategy of establishing and consolidating a new and more favourable internationally recognized maritime order in the Black Sea, Kerch Strait, and the Sea of Azov. Empirical data shows that Russian superiority over Ukraine and inferiority vis-a-vis the West shaped a double asymmetry of its tactics of projecting power against Ukraine while avoiding confrontation with the West. Eventually, Moscow reached a point where the gray zone tactics could not secure its objectives. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 signalled the exhausting coercive potential of a gray zone conflict. Although, despite of transition to conventional warfare, we found continuity of ‘gray zone’ tactics of double asymmetry and denying responsibility in the Russian playbook. Hence, a possible de-escalation of the Russia – Ukraine war may likely return to a gray zone conflict.
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