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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
107647
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Roel Meijer's edited volume fills massive gaps in the Western literature on Salafism, presenting a highly nuanced account of a diverse and internally divided religious identity movement while avoiding the opposing pitfalls of apologetics and polemics. Aside from the diversity of the movement, a key theme throughout the volume is the persistent malleability of Salafi ideology, which has major implications for states, social policy, and international security. The unavoidable conclusion seems to be that even "quietist" strands cannot be considered reliably quietist. Those who seek to better understand the tensions within Salafism, the relationship between this movement and states around the world, and how Salafism stands in relation to various forms of aggressive, violent contention would be well-advised to refer to this volume.
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| 2 |
ID:
107972
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article claims that the ongoing debate about the structure and dynamics of Al Qaeda has failed to appreciate the importance of an organizational layer that is situated between the top leadership and the grass-roots. Rather than being "leaderless," it is the group's middle management that holds Al Qaeda together. In Clausewitzian terms, Al Qaeda's middle managers represent a center of gravity-a "hub of … power and movement"-that facilitates the grass-roots' integration into the organization and provides the top leadership with the global reach it needs in order to carry out its terrorist campaign, especially in Europe and North America. They are, in other words, the connective tissue that makes Al Qaeda work. The article substantiates this hypothesis by providing a number of case studies of Al Qaeda middle managers, which illustrate the critical role they have played in integrating the grass-roots with the top leadership. The policy implications are both obvious and important. If neither the top leadership nor the grass-roots alone can provide Al Qaeda with strategic momentum, it will be essential to identify and neutralize the middle managers, and-in doing so-"cause the network to collapse on itself."
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| 3 |
ID:
107046
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article claims that the ongoing debate about the structure and dynamics of Al Qaeda has failed to appreciate the importance of an organizational layer that is situated between the top leadership and the grass-roots. Rather than being "leaderless," it is the group's middle management that holds Al Qaeda together. In Clausewitzian terms, Al Qaeda's middle managers represent a center of gravity-a "hub of … power and movement"-that facilitates the grass-roots' integration into the organization and provides the top leadership with the global reach it needs in order to carry out its terrorist campaign, especially in Europe and North America. They are, in other words, the connective tissue that makes Al Qaeda work. The article substantiates this hypothesis by providing a number of case studies of Al Qaeda middle managers, which illustrate the critical role they have played in integrating the grass-roots with the top leadership. The policy implications are both obvious and important. If neither the top leadership nor the grass-roots alone can provide Al Qaeda with strategic momentum, it will be essential to identify and neutralize the middle managers, and-in doing so-"cause the network to collapse on itself."
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