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| 1 |
ID:
111892
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Though parts of Somalia appear mired in intractable conflict, both domestic and foreign trade continues. As a result amidst the conflict, corruption, and chaos Somalia's business community is a small force for peace and stability. Thus, efforts directed at enhancing the business community, possibly via the Transitional Federal Government or its successor, could play a small role in improving the situation in this strategically poised country with a very entrepreneurial population. However, such success is far from certain, and numerous other factors besides a strengthened business community would have to occur for Somalia even to begin the journey on the long road to recovery.
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| 2 |
ID:
139118
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From 2006 to 2011, al Qaeda's East African proxy, al Shabaab, served as de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al Shabaab and the Burundian and Ugandan Peacekeepers of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery, or development. Beginning in August 2011, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al Shabaab from Mogadishu, then subsequently, Kismayo, and ultimately to consolidate and reorganize in the Somali hinterland. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the newly recognized Somali Federal Government (SFG), neutralize al Shabaab, and provide good governance to its constituents. Al Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and their offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamic extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the Western Indian Ocean, destabilize East Africa, and adversely impact millions.
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| 3 |
ID:
107327
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The election of Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed as the transitional president of Somalia was the climax of the United Nations (UN)-led Djibouti peace process. The election, it was hoped, would herald the beginning of the reconstitution of the Somalian state. Unfortunately, nearly three years after the event, that has still not happened. The government of Sheik Sharif has faced a number of challenges which are yet to be resolved. In the end, the Djibouti peace process has not guaranteed a stable and functional national government in Somalia.
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