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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
107488
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper, we analyze the impact of uncertain disruptions in gas supply upon gas retailer contracting behavior and consequent price and welfare implications in a gas market characterized by long-term gas contracts using a static Cournot model. In order to most realistically describe the economical situation, our representation divides the market into two stages: the upstream market that links, by means of long-term contracts, producers in exporting countries (Russia, Algeria, etc.) to local retailers who bring gas to the consuming countries to satisfy local demands in the downstream market. Disruption costs are modeled using short-run demand functions. First we mathematically develop a general model and write the associated KKT conditions, then we propose some case studies, under iso-elasticity assumptions, for the long-short-run inverse-demand curves in order to predict qualitatively and quantitatively the impacts of supply disruptions on Western European gas trade. In the second part, we study in detail the German gas market of the 1980s to explain the supply choices of the German retailer, and we derive interesting conclusions and insights concerning the amounts and prices of natural gas brought to the market. The last part of the paper is dedicated to a study of the Bulgarian gas market, which is greatly dependent on the Russian gas supplies and hence very sensitive to interruption risks. Some interesting conclusions are derived concerning the necessity to economically regulate the market, by means of gas amounts control, if the disruption probability is high enough.
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| 2 |
ID:
177473
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2019, the European Commission finalized a legal framework for “Citizens” and “Renewable Energy Communities”, paving the way for their deployment. While the benefits of such communities have been discussed, there is increasing concern that inadequate grid tariffs may lead to excess adoption of such business models. Furthermore, snowball effects may be observed following the effects these communities have on grid tariffs. We show that restraining the study to a simple financial analysis is far from satisfactory. Therefore, we use the framework of cooperative game theory to take account of the ability of communities to share gains between members. The interaction between energy communities and the distribution system operator then results in a non-cooperative equilibrium. We provide mathematical formulations and intuitions of such effects, and carry out realistic numerical applications where communities can invest jointly in solar panels and batteries. We show that such a snowball effect may be observed, but its magnitude and its welfare effects will depend on the grid tariff structure that is implemented, leading to possible over-investments in photo-voltaic panels. In particular, we find that setting a fixed grid tariff strongly mitigates such over-investments.
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