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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
107533
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many rebel organizations receive significant assistance from external governments, yet the reasons why some rebels attract foreign support while others do not is poorly understood. We analyze factors determining external support for insurgent groups from a principal-agent perspective. We focus on both the supply side, that is, when states are willing to support insurgent groups in other states, and the demand side, that is, when groups are willing to accept such support, with the conditions that this may entail. We test our hypotheses using new disaggregated data on insurgent groups and foreign support. Our results indicate that external rebel support is influenced by characteristics of the rebel group as well as linkages between rebel groups and actors in other countries. More specifically, we find that external support is more likely for moderately strong groups where support is more likely to be offered and accepted, in the presence of transnational constituencies, international rivalries, and when the government receives foreign support.
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| 2 |
ID:
133276
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although some rebel groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes. We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces incentives to "win the hearts and minds" of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population. However, unlike other lucrative resources, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms. Some external principals-namely, democracies and states with strong human rights lobbies-are more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than others. Multiple state principals also lead to abuse because no single state can effectively restrain the organization. We test these conjectures with new data on foreign support for rebel groups and data on one-sided violence against civilians. Most notably, we find strong evidence that principal characteristics help influence agent actions.
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| 3 |
ID:
190837
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although diasporas often leave their homelands due to violence or political upheaval, these groups may engage in homeland politics by providing financial, material, or diplomatic assistance to militants engaged in civil conflicts. Conversely, diasporas may ignore homeland civil conflicts and exclusively focus on opportunities available in their host states. This study argues that variation in diasporas’ degree of integration into their host states influences whether diasporas support militants opposing homeland governments. Diaspora members may be dissimilated, which undermines their ability to consolidate resources in support of homeland militants, or incorporated, which limits their will to engage in homeland civil conflicts. Moderately integrated diasporas, which maintain identity ties with the homeland and have access to beneficial resources, are most likely to aid militants fighting homeland civil conflicts. Using original data, I test and find support for this integration-based theory.
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