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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
163792
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do people form beliefs about the factual content of major events when established geopolitical orders are violently challenged? Here, we address the tragic events of 2 May 2014, in Odesa, Ukraine. There, Euromaidan protest movement supporters and opponents clashed following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the onset of the Donbas conflict, culminating in the worst civilian death toll the city had seen since World War II. Shortly after, we surveyed Ukraine’s population about who they thought had actually perpetrated the killings and relate people’s answers to alternative narratives (frames) that an original content analysis finds were available to Ukrainian citizens through different media. We find evidence, consistent with theories of hot cognition and motivated reasoning, that the Odesa violence triggered emotional responses linked to ethnic, regional, and partisan identity, which then activated attitudes associated with these identities that, in turn, led people to adopt very different (sometimes highly improbable) beliefs about who carried out the killings. Ethnic identity in particular is found to have strongly moderated the effects of television, with Ukrainian television greatly influencing Ukrainians but backfiring among Russians, and Russian television mainly impacting non-Ukrainians. Education and local information are found to reduce susceptibility to televised factual narratives.
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| 2 |
ID:
107551
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We develop a model of repeated conflict that features probabilistic winner-take-all outcomes and compare its dynamics to the dynamics generated by a similar deterministic model in which combatants divide the conflict spoils. While these models generate the same behavior in a one-shot game, in a repeated setting the winner-take-all model generates richer dynamics than the dynamics generated by the deterministic model, which are new to the economics literature on conflict. As in real-world conflicts, the winner-take-all model generates changes in the relative dominance of combatants, full mobilization of fighting resources, and endogenous surrender. We evaluate the implications for the literature.
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| 3 |
ID:
117207
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| 4 |
ID:
138599
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1941 Japan weighed the merits of attacking the most powerful country in the world: the United States. It was a war of choice, and Tokyo had time to carefully consider the decision. Japanese leaders debated the best date to strike Pearl Harbor. And they also thought through the potential short-term effects. But Tokyo barely considered the military endgame: the final stages of a campaign in which an armistice is negotiated, hostilities cease and a new post-war order emerges.
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| 5 |
ID:
034869
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| Publication |
London, Lennard Publishing, 1987.
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| Description |
140p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
1852910062
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 029439 | 923.541/HAM 029439 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
114692
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt has survived since 1979. Even so, following the events in Egypt, there is a growing tension between the two states, particularly surrounding the Sinai, which could cause a crisis and even a war. In such a case, the main battlefield would be in Sinai, and there would be several dominant aspects. Some of them would appear for the first time, compared with previous wars, such as a collision between Israeli and Egyptian units of around corps size. Other aspects would be more familiar, such as the ratio between the size of the forces to that of the battlefield, the "fog of war," night fighting, "friendly fire" and deception.
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