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| 1 |
ID:
190663
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Indo-Pacific region has become a central focus of great power competition. Not surprisingly, a rising China seeks to play an important, if not a leading role in the transformation of Asia’s present regional order. The United States, meanwhile, as the unipole, has strong incentives to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Facing certain structural and domestic constraints, China is disinclined to resort to the strategy of violent revision or subversion historically pursued by previous rising powers. Instead, China has pursued a gradual change of the existing regional order through a combination of internal balancing and external reassurance strategies. Specifically, China’s quest for great power status in the region, particularly in response to the Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the United States since the Trump administration, has prompted its proactive shift to counterbalance the US’ vision of order in the region. This paper argues that the balance of power and the balance of alignment constitute two key variables that affect the prospect of Sino-US competition for a preferable regional order. Beijing’s balancing strategies have significantly enhanced its economic and military capabilities, reducing the gap with the United States on the one hand and attracted certain regional states to join China-led regional initiatives on the other. However, owing to the complex balancing dynamics in the region and the agency of small and middle powers, the balance of alignment supports neither American nor Chinese dominance of Asia. Contrary to the ‘new Cold War’ narrative, the contest for order does not entail dividing the region into two rival blocs, but rather creating certain overlapping groupings and coalitions led by the two great powers. It consequently also signifies that the current order transition under a new bipolarity will be prolonged and relatively stable compared to the Cold War bipolarity.
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| 2 |
ID:
177653
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| Summary/Abstract |
While differences remain, the gap between US and European debates over the likely impact of China’s rise on the
global order has narrowed in recent years. At the same time,
China’s leaders have been more confident in establishing
dichotomized distinctions between their view of how the
world should be ordered and how China will act as a great
power on one hand, and what they depict as the West’s preferences and the typical modus operandi of Western powers
on the other. Despite evidence of ever clearer dividing lines
between different visions of China’s impact on the future of
the global order, this is not the same as a return to bipolarity. The problems of disentangling transnational economic
relations, different levels of followership for potential leaders, and pragmatic considerations of governance efficacy in
diverse issue areas all suggest something other than fixed
bloc-type alliances on either side of a bipolar divide.
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| 3 |
ID:
174876
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| Summary/Abstract |
Donald Trump’s presidency steered U.S.-China relations into a phase of open rivalry for global domination. The U.S. has failed to sidestep the risk of confrontation with China that Graham Allison warned of with his “Thucydides trap” metaphor. The two countries’ strongest trading and economic interdependence has proven unable to prevent a political standoff between Washington and Beijing. Their competition in science and engineering may result in the emergence of two technoeconomic platforms other countries will have to choose between. At the same time, the new U.S.-Chinese bipolarity is far more complex and internally controversial, which is a reason enough to postulate the existence of a “double Thucydides trap.” Importantly, global development is being greatly influenced by the interaction within the U.S.-China-Russia triangle.
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| 4 |
ID:
123138
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have debated the merits of the major theoretical traditions in international relations and foreign policy. Neorealism was criticized for failing to predict the end of bipolarity in material capabilities. Constructivism emerged during this time as a viable alternative explanation for the Cold War based on the role of ideas. This paper seeks to assess the impact of material and ideational factors on the origin, development, and end of the Cold War through an examination of the roles adopted by U.S. Presidents in their foreign policy doctrines. The paper finds that the origin of the Cold War was primarily ideational and was constituted by the "roles of bipolarity" adopted in the Truman Doctrine. During the Cold War, minor variations in these roles can be explained by shifts in material capabilities. The end of the Cold War was the result of changes in Soviet ideas, which were later confirmed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the end of bipolarity, we see the United States struggling to identify its proper foreign policy role.
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| 5 |
ID:
163073
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| Summary/Abstract |
All Warsaw Pact countries developed intense relations with Third World countries during the 1970s, following in Moscow’s footsteps, allegedly supporting the struggle against Western imperialism while making profitable arms deals. One Warsaw Pact country, though, saw things differently: it was both American and Soviet imperialism that had to be fought off. This paper reassesses the origins and nature of Romania’s Third World policy in the context of the Soviet–American détente of 1972. Détente was perceived in Bucharest as a risk to the country’s independent foreign policy and a consolidation of the existing bipolarity which is why Romania tried to mobilise small and medium states of the Third World in a fight against hegemony and underdevelopment. Although they adhered to the developmental debates and tried to join the Group of 77, the Romanians viewed underdevelopment not necessarily in structural terms but rather as a product of political obstructions exerted by the superpowers. Refusing the take the Soviet side in the Third World, Romania tried to convince Third World leaders that unity and cooperation among the ‘unprivileged’ were a shield against foreign interference and a guarantee of development.
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| 6 |
ID:
185231
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper demonstrates that when a superpower within a bipolar system fights against a small rival either that is located beyond its sphere of influence or that has geostrategic importance to the other acting superpower, other forces matter more than the distribution of capabilities between the belligerents. Within the study I review two primary explanations for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite the strong resistance of local forces to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, mainly by the Afghan Mujahedeen, Moscow failed to predict the political outcomes of the war. It was in fact a series of negative feedbacks that caused Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan after a decade-long intervention that did not achieve any political goals. One such example was the direct strike against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, launched and coordinated by the United States as the other acting superpower under the bipolar system of that time.
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| 7 |
ID:
120376
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| 8 |
ID:
107613
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The argument that multipolar international systems are less stable because certain states have an incentive to externalize the costs of defense to other states has been built on interpretations of the behavior of France, Russia, and especially Great Britain between the two World Wars. This article addresses flaws in both the use of the French and Russian cases, but is most tightly focused on the British case, which was the strongest, prima facie, of the three. This article demonstrates how the British scheme for defense against Germany was not a policy of attempted externalization on either the political or military level. Consequently, the long debate over the relationship between systemic structure and systemic stability, which has been heavily influenced by the belief in the existence of an incentive to externalize defense costs under multipolarity, must be re-examined, with new tests run and new conclusions explored.
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