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| 1 |
ID:
107701
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyses potential future collaborative space exploration architectures in terms of 1) the technical capabilities of contributing partners; and 2) the constraints imposed by internal and international politics. We find that when international partners are considered endogenously, the argument for a "flexible path" approach is weakened substantially. This is because international contributions can make "Moon first" economically feasible; and characteristics of proposed "flexible path" approaches may preclude international involvement because of the disproportionate risk that those contributions inherently bear. This could have serious implications for future collaborations. We also note that while there are multiple feasible collaborative architectures, there is currently substantial overlap among the potential niche contributions identified by the international partners.
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| 2 |
ID:
132718
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite a rich legacy of impressive technological accomplishments, the government acquisition of advanced space systems is increasingly synonymous with schedule slips and cost overruns. Program reviews have suggested that investing more in centralized and strategic research and development outside particular programs will reduce technical uncertainties and improve cost and schedule outcomes. This paper suggests roles for a centralized technology office by examining the methods available in the literature for managing portfolios of research projects.
In particular, the paper answers three questions. Firstly, it examines the key features that characterize the space agencies' innovation context compared to the private sector where most of the portfolio literature is founded. Secondly, it summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the models in the literature. Finally, the paper addresses how innovation decision making should be structured within agencies in order to achieve the best results. The paper concludes that an executive level technology office is best placed to act as an enabler, rather than an absolute decision maker. Such an office would not replace decision making at the technical manager level, but would provide overall strategic direction and guidance within which technical managers can make decisions about project innovation.
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| 3 |
ID:
132720
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Innovation is fundamental to a space agency's mission. Yet, the industry's current dominant approach to new technology development - concerted investment in step-changes in capabilities to support a particular application - contradicts the conventional wisdom of innovation theory. In order to understand why, this paper uses a unique empirical case study, in which exogenous historical circumstances created unexpected additional opportunities for technology investment, to explore the merits of this approach. The value of follow-on periods of R&D is assessed in terms of simple marginal returns, implications for workforce dynamics and the interaction of mission sequencing and technology strategy. The analysis reveals an important contingency between mission paradigm and the value of follow-on investment. Specifically, while marginal performance improvements can be achieved at lower costs, their value depends on the availability of an appropriate mission opportunity. In the current paradigm, the risk of obsolescence is high compared to the potential benefit. However, if a new small mission, frequent flights, paradigm were to take hold, there may be great value in refocusing R&D strategy on later round improvements.
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